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A Marriage of Convenience: Batista and the Communists, 1933 – 1944 
 
C. Clayton Hollenkamp 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper examines the relationship between Fulgencio Batista and the 
Communist Party of Cuba.  At odds during the first several years of Batista’s rule, when 
strikes and repression were the topics of the day, the two sides eventually saw in each 
other a means to an end.  In efforts to understand the Cuban Revolution of the late 
1950’s, historians often portray Batista as a dictatorial puppet of American business and 
policy.  Contrary to this image, in his first regime (1934 until 1944), Batista presided over 
the creation of a nominal constitutional democracy.  To do this he needed the support and 
good conduct of organized labor, in which the Communists could be a powerful force. 
In 1935 the Communist Party International, based in Moscow, adopted a shift in 
tactics.  So as to combat fascism, the Party turned away from its traditionally isolationist 
line.  It sought to make alliances with like-minded groups and wanted to serve in the 
government.  In mid-1938 an agreement was reached between Batista and Party heads 
from which sprang a mutually beneficial alliance lasting through the first batistato.  The 
relationship is often overlooked in Cuban historiography and many questions remain. 
To truly understand its significance we need more information as to origins, conditions, 
and consequences of the agreements.  This paper explores the conditions on both sides, 
seeking to understand how and why the unlikely bedfellows came together.  As well, it 
 iii 
traces the relationship until the end of Batista’s term in 1944, focusing on the ebb and 
flow of support concerning major issues of the day, such as organized labor, the 
constitutional assembly, the election of 1940, and involvement in World War II.  Finally, 
this study shows how the alliance with the Communist Party is a necessary point in a full 
understanding of Fulgencio Batista and the era. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In History Will Absolve Me, Fidel Castro delivered a scathing indictment of 
Fulgencio Batista.  Defending his attack on the Moncada barracks on July 26, 1953, he 
charged that Batista’s unconstitutional and dictatorial regime ignored the extreme 
suffering of the Cuban people.  He described the plight of the population, claiming to 
struggle on behalf of the 700,000 Cubans without work, the 500,000 agricultural laborers 
who lived in barely inhabitable hovels, the 100,000 small farmers who lived and died on 
land that is not theirs, and the 60,000 young professionals and established businessmen 
who ready to enter the work force only to become weighted down by debt or find all 
doors closed to them by the oligarchy.  He also criticized the lopsided distribution of 
wealth and the unequal dissemination of land in a nation that was still largely 
agricultural.  Then, Castro revealed his planned “Revolutionary Laws” and changes he 
would make should his movement succeed.  At the end of his statement, Castro took on a 
popular image among revolutionaries: the martyr.  Confident that he acted for the benefit 
of the Cuban nation, Castro closed his discourse with “Condemn me.  It does not matter. 
History will absolve me.”1 
In many ways, Fidel’s assessment of the Batista government was on target.  No 
one can deny the corruption in the bureaucracy nor the limitations placed on personal 
freedoms and constitutional guarantees.  At the same time though, Castro carefully wove 
                                                 
1      Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me: The Moncada Trial Defense Speech, Santiago de Cuba, 
October 16th, 1953 (London,: Cape, 1968) 101. 
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into his speech some exaggerations and sidestepped some issues for the sake of his own 
argument.  A very noticeable example of a misrepresentation was Castro’s portrayal of 
the Auténtico regimes that preceded Batista’s military dictatorship.  Castro described the 
previous regimes of Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socorrás as legitimate 
governments of “a republic.  It had its constitution, its laws, its civil rights, a president, a 
congress, and law courts.”2 The presidents of Cuba from 1944 until Batista’s coup d’etat 
in March of 1952 were indeed constitutionally elected in what most historians agree were 
among the fairest elections in the history of the island.  Moreover, Grau and Prío gave 
enough respect to Congress and the system of government outlined by the Constitution of 
1940 to be considered within the bounds of that document.  However, any further 
representation of the Auténtico years as just is clearly over-romanticism with the purpose 
of highlighting the abuses of the Batista regime.  Hugh Thomas commented, “Grau 
turned his presidency into an orgy of theft, ill-disguised by emotional nationalistic 
speeches.  He did more than any other single man to kill the hope of democratic practice 
in Cuba.”  Thomas had little better to say about Prío, noting only his cool, suave 
demeanor that Cubans later learned to distrust and his weakness for corruption. 
The numbers Castro quoted when describing the situation of the population have 
at least one irregularity in them as well.  Castro noted 500,000 agricultural laborers who 
lived in miserable circumstances.  However, the 1953 census listed only 510,000 
agricultural laborers in Cuba, 118,000 of which lived in destitute poverty. 3  One could 
easily overlook this statistical error as it is slight.  But, minor as it is, the sympathetic 
assessment of the Auténtico regimes exemplified a most cherished and necessary weapon 
                                                 
2      Castro, 1-26. 
3      Hugh Thomas, Cuba : Or, the Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971) 759-63. 
 3 
in the revolutionary’s arsenal: the manipulation of history.  Fulgencio Batista remains a 
caricature in Cuban historiography, demonized by the revolutionary left and ignored by 
the right.  A recent biography by Frank Argote-Freyre, Fulgencio Batista: From 
Revolutionary to Strongman,4 represents the first scholarly effort to appraise Batista.  
Much work remains to be done.   
This paper will examine the first Batista regime with a particular eye on a facet of 
it that has been overlooked by fidelistas and batistianos, the symbiotic relationship 
between the Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba, PCC) and the 
Batista government.  Because of the sometimes strange unraveling of history, neither 
those sympathetic nor those in opposition to the Revolution are happy to note the 
agreement made between the two in 1938.  However, it was highly significant and was a 
principal factor in creating democracy in Cuba. 
This work will chronicle the evolution of the relationship between the PCC and 
Batista from its origins until 1944, the end of Batista’s presidential term. In the early 
years, hostilities between the two were rampant.  The PCC played a part in much of the 
opposition to the government.  This paper will explore the conditions on both sides that 
allowed an agreement in 1938. This study will continue through 1944 so as to examine 
how the agreement between Batista and the communists played out.  However, by ending 
the examination with the conclusion of Batista’s term as the constitutionally elected 
president of Cuba and not including the 1950’s, this study will isolate him from the 
political controversy that overwhelmed him and the historiography.   
                                                 
4      Frank Argote-Freyre, "Fulgencio Batista : From Revolutionary to Strongman," Thesis (Ph. D.), 
Rutgers University, 2004. 
 4 
Little is known about the actual terms of the entente cordial.  No written 
document was signed, and it is likely that only those at the critical meeting in the summer 
of 1938 knew the exact provisions of the arrangement.  By examining the working 
relationship from 1938 until 1944, one can deduce the terms of the agreement.  As well, 
this paper will set forth the argument that Batista’s overthrow of Grau was a continuation 
and not a frustration of the lofty goals of 1933.  While explaining the evolution of the 
pact between Batista and the PCC, this paper will also analyze the extent of social 
welfare programs and legislation he enacted during his time in power.  Batista’s often 
forgotten social record made him a viable ally in the eyes of the PCC, and it suggests that 
Batista was not the counter-revolutionary as he is represented in many histories of the 
era. 
 5 
 
 
 
 
Review of Relevant Literature  
 
 
This paper takes as its point of departure a phenomenon first noted by Karl Marx 
in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.  Marx noted how societies on the 
doorstep of great change need constant reassurances that their action is somehow 
consistent with the past.  Marx commented: “Just when men seem engaged in 
revolutionizing themselves and things… they anxiously conjure up spirits of the past to 
their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present 
the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed 
language.”5  Louis A. Pérez Jr. later applied Marx’s assertion to Cuban history.  Pérez 
recognized the Revolutionary Government’s use of history as a tool of legitimization in 
his article “In Service of the Revolution: Two Decades of Cuban Historiography, 1959-
1979”.  He posited that “redefining the future requires reconsidering the past.”  When a 
revolution succeeds, new leaders must identify themselves with national heroes and 
distance themselves from the deeds of those whom they deposed.  In order to create a 
historical context for his revolution Castro had to co-opt, as symbols, men of the distant 
past such as Martí, and disassociate himself from the recent past.6 
Continuing in the trend, Pérez’s article, “History, Historiography and Cuban 
Studies: A Retrospective” in his compilation Essays on Cuban History, looked 
                                                 
5      Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1994) 
15-17. 
6      Louis A. Pérez Jr., “In Service of the Revolution: Two Decades of Cuban Historiography, 1959-1979,” 
Hispanic American Historical Review, 60. 1 (1980): 79-89. 
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specifically at the effect the revolution of 1959 had on the way historians interpreted 
events both after and before 1959.  Pérez asserted that much of the history written after 
1959 has been based on the assumption of the “essential historicity of the Revolution.”  
According to the author, historians felt no matter how much the Revolution seemed like a 
complete rupture with the past, it simply had to have its roots in history.  In the efforts to 
explain the Revolution, historians interpreted all events in respect to it.   
The author cited the importance of the Revolution in Cuban historiography, 
noting how so much of the post-1959 work done in the field is dedicated to its study. 
Because of this lightning rod quality possessed by the action of the 1950’s, many of the 
principal players became remembered solely for their exploits in that turbulent era, so 
much so that they became foils for their respective character types.  The counter-
revolutionary and the guerilla fighter are archetypes that are, because of the historical 
process Pérez identified, easily associated with Batista and Castro.  By the early 1960’s, 
the leadership committed itself to a total break with the old order and all its institutions, 
beliefs, and symbols.  Pérez rightly claims that the ascendancy of the revolutionary 
government created a new venue for revisionist histories.  Themes previously shied away 
from in deference to the close relationship with the United States such as neo-
colonialism, imperialism, and the pseudo-republic that existed under the Platt 
Amendment, took center stage and became the new vogue among historians. 
Public policy and the media came together in an effort of political socialization 
that re-educated the Cuban people about their national past.  The effort was ever-present, 
and evident in most forms of communication.  Political rhetoric and school curricula 
reflected the new focus and spin on the past.  Virtually all newspapers and magazines had 
 7 
some column devoted to Cuban history.  The magazine Verde Olivo featured two such 
sections called “Marchando con la Historia” and “Paginas de nuestra Historia.”  The 
journal of the sugar industry, Cuba Azucar, included a regular section on the Cuban past 
named “Haciendo Historia,” a title nearly parodying itself, suggesting as much history is 
being constructed as is being related.  The main organ of the Revolution, “Granma,” 
published a recurring column entitled “Que Fue la República,” which specifically 
recounted the corruption and abuses of the ancien regime.  As well, the Cuban Film 
Institute (ICAIC) participated by creating films such as “Lucia,” “Viva La República,” 
and “El Otro Francisco.”  These films recast the national past in powerful images laced 
with nationalistic ideals popular at the time.7  By use of these devices, the Castro regime 
was able to equate itself with the figures of the distant past, especially José Martí, and 
castigate others found to be contrary to the revolution.  The regime successfully 
characterized the recent past as a vice-laden era, sated with corruption and entirely under 
the influence of the exploitative Americans. 
From the start of the Revolution, an obvious focus of ridicule was Fulgencio 
Batista.  In History Will Absolve Me Castro takes every chance to attack Batista.  At one 
point he called Batista “Monstrum Horrendum,” saying “he has not human entrails.”  He 
accused Batista or his government of more than thirty crimes, including corruption and 
murder.  As early as his 1953 trial Castro sought to paint Batista as a slave to personal 
gain and capable of atrocities in its acquisition.  Castro recounted example after example 
                                                 
7      Louis A. Pérez Jr., Essays on Cuban History : Historiography and Research (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1995) 180. 
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of how the government robbed and brutally oppressed the population so as to satisfy the 
“great financial interests.”8   
As it is a basic premise of this paper that the Revolution altered the methodologies 
of Cuban historiography, I intend to analyze the pre-revolutionary period on its own merit 
and not simply as the linear predecessor of the Revolution.  This paper will seek to 
portray the actors as they were in the years under study without regards to the roles they 
eventually played during the insurrection of the late 1950’s. 
Despite being aware of the Revolution’s impact on historiography, it seems that 
Pérez also fell victim to its influence.  In his major works, Cuba, Between Reform and 
Revolution
9 and Cuba and the U.S.: Ties of Singular Intimacy,10 Pérez’s view of Batista’s 
first regime is through a lens clouded by the failures of his second.  In his treatment of the 
overthrow of the government of Ramón Grau San Martín in January 1934, for example,   
Pérez portrayed Batista as merely a tool of Sumner Welles, the representative of the 
American government in Havana.  He argued that Batista came to oppose Grau primarily 
at the behest of Welles, who believed a change in government was imperative in order to 
maintain stability, a necessity for business interests.11  The author speaks of no other 
factors in explaining the overthrow.  He took a similar point of view in his work on 
relations between the U.S. and Cuba.  It is certain that the Grau government could not 
have maintained its position for long without the recognition from Washington, but by 
taking away all initiative from Batista, the architect of the revolt that put Grau into 
                                                 
8      Castro, 28. 
9      Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba : Between Reform and Revolution, Latin American Histories, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
10      Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba and the United States : Ties of Singular Intimacy, The United States and the 
Americas, 2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997). 
11      Pérez, Cuba : Between Reform and Revolution  275. 
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power, Pérez made him into the American puppet that we remember from his second 
regime.   
A similar case can be made concerning Pérez’s comments about Batista’s 
brutality.  While it is not the purpose of this study to revise or apologize for Batista’s 
image, Pérez’s treatment of these issues should be examined.  Two events that are often 
cited as examples of brutality during the first batistiato are the repression of the strike of 
March 1935 and the assassination of Antonio Guiteras.  Pérez connected these two issues, 
claiming that Guiteras’s assassination was punishment for his role in inciting the strike 
two months earlier.  Pérez noted the many casualties of the repression of the strike by the 
police and the killing of Guiteras by the army.  However, his telling of the facts implied 
that Batista was directly responsible for both acts, failing to mention that others might 
have played a part in the action.  President Mendieta declared martial law on Havana and 
Colonel Jose Eleutario Pedraza was on the ground in command of the force of 
strikebreakers.12  Batista certainly wielded enough power to influence Mendieta and 
Pedraza.  However, he was not the sole actor in the event.  Concerning the death of 
Guiteras, an article in the magazine Bohemia, a longtime critic of the regime, claimed 
Batista sent Colonel Ignacio Galindez to offer Guiteras safe passage to Havana and out of 
the country, but he was not in time as other army units found him first.  Guiteras and his 
men came out firing, and he was killed in the fray.13   
Most important for the purposes of this study, Pérez dedicated very little space to 
the mutual support between the Communist Party and Batista.  In Batista’s second term 
he was a firm anti-communist, but in his first he collaborated with the PCC.  Pérez noted 
                                                 
12      Mario Riera Hernández, Un Presidente Constructivo, (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1966) 17-18. 
13      Jorge Quintana, Bohemia August 25, 1946: 32. 
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only the peace made in 1937 and the entrance of the PCC into electoral politics.  He 
noted that membership increased in the years leading up to 1944 and that the PCC gained 
a foothold in the government.14  However, he fell far short of recognizing the true 
significance of the agreement between Batista and the group, an agreement that led to the 
support of many Batista policies by the PCC and vice versa. 
All in all, it seems that Louis Pérez failed to heed his own warnings about the 
effect the Cuban Revolution has on history.  In both of his texts, he viewed the Batista of 
the 1930’s as the brutal American puppet that he became in the 1950’s.  His 
interpretation, like many others, sought to shape the Cuban past in such a way that Batista 
fulfilled the historic function of the evil autocrat.  In this process, much of the complexity 
and fullness of the pre-revolutionary era was sacrificed, and Batista is understood as a 
one-dimensional figure. 
The proposition that the Revolution was the product of the times before it cannot 
be argued.  It would be silly to claim that it had no historical basis.  However, this paper 
will avoid the approach taken by Ramón Eduardo Ruiz in his work Cuba: The Making of 
a Revolution.15  In his work the author took the position that the Revolution of 1959 was 
the result of a process that began nearly one-hundred years earlier during the Ten Years 
War (1868-1878) and gained steam until it reached its climax in the late 1950’s.  He 
examined the Cuban nationalism that had its beginning in the 1860’s and was a 
motivating factor in the War for Cuban Independence.  As well, Ruiz designated a 
chapter to understand José Martí and his role in the war effort.  In later chapters Ruiz 
                                                 
14      Pérez, Cuba : Between Reform and Revolution  277. 
15      Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, Cuba; the Making of a Revolution (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1968). 
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explored the Revolution of 1933, the Batista and Auténtico years and the Revolution of 
1959. 
While Pérez’s argument was shaped by the Revolution only implicitly by 
approaching its antecedents in terms of their consequence on the Revolution, Ruiz 
immediately made the reader aware of this bias that is seen throughout the book.  A fine 
example is his treatment of the Revolution of 1933 and the Batista era.  From early on, 
Ruiz noted the growth of anti-Americanism beginning with José Martí, who opposed 
American intervention in the war for independence as it might compromise Cuban 
sovereignty.  He was posthumously proven right by the establishment of the Platt 
Amendment in 1902.  As economic and military intervention on the part of the United 
States expanded through the first third of the twentieth century, anti-U.S. sentiment grew 
also.  The chapters Ruiz dedicated to what he called the “second historical cycle,” from 
1933 until 1958, he named The Lost Opportunity and The Return of the Old Order.  
According to his interpretation, the overthrow of the Grau regime that lasted some 130 
days frustrated the chance Cuba had to distance itself from the United States.  In his next 
chapter Ruiz noted how many of the same characters involved in politics before 1933 
returned afterwards, and because of this, the reliance on the United States remained.16 
By pointing out the anti-Americanism already in existence in the 1930’s, he was 
able to refer to it in the 1950’s as a leading cause of the Revolution.  However, in making 
his case for the American domination of the economy and the repression handed down by 
the American-puppet leaders, Ruiz gave less significance to the abrogation of the Platt 
Amendment and reforms demanded by Grau and enacted by Batista.  He also noted the 
                                                 
16      Ruiz, 77-114. 
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sad situation of the poor in Cuba but failed to note the newfound power of organized 
labor in the 1930’s.  Finally, he failed to remember that foreign ownership of the sugar 
industry declined sharply long before the Castro regime took hold.17  He claimed that the 
pattern of foreign domination continued.  This interpretation is a consequence of the 
biases used in examining the Revolution.  A reformist Batista does not coalesce well with 
the image Ruiz painted of the Batista of the 1950’s. 
Jorge I. Domínguez’s study of the Cuban Revolution, Cuba: Order and 
Revolution,18 is a thoroughly empirical examination of changes in politics and society of 
modern Cuba.  Domínguez separated Cuban history into three broad eras, 1902 until 
1933, 1934 until 1958, and 1959 until 1978, the year the book was published.  He 
outlined the political systems that operated during the first two eras in the early chapters 
of his work.  He placed considerable emphasis on the shift in American policy from 
imperialism to hegemony.  The lack of willingness to land troops and the distancing from 
daily politics are two examples of results of the new relationship that existed between the 
United States and those nations whose fortunes rose and fell with the approval of the 
American government.19 
The majority of his work is spent discussing the years after the revolution of 
1959.  Domínguez attributed Batista’s fall and the rise of Castro to the widely held belief 
that the Batista government was illegitimate, corrupt and, because of Batista’s pursuit of 
                                                 
17      John E. Fagg. Rev. of “Cuba: The Making of a Revolution.” Hispanic American Historical Review 
49.3 (1969): 570-572. 
18      Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba : Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1978). 
19      Domínguez, 77-91. 
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foreign investment, increasingly indifferent to Cuban ideals of nationalism.20  
Domínguez’s perception and interpretation of the era do not seem to be skewed by the 
Revolution.  Where Pérez emphasized either Batista’s agency or lack thereof in certain 
situations, Domínguez viewed Batista as a powerbroker working between various 
factions in the government.  In his analysis of the years from 1933 until 1945, 
Domínguez gave great weight to the power wielded by interest groups.  He commented 
that where as interest groups held sway under previous administrations, acting as 
lobbyists on the fringes of government, under the Batista regime, interest groups took 
active part in the making of policy.21 
As an example of how this process worked, the author cited the interplay between 
the colonos and the hacendados on one side and organized labor on the other.  As these 
entities gained political power through patronage, loyalty, and corruption they influenced 
and sometimes indeed crafted the laws that pertained to their particular sphere; the 
Colonos wrote sugar legislation and organized labor debated and implemented labor 
legislation.  The obvious confluence of these two areas often brought on tensions and 
impediments that had to be resolved.  Domínguez claimed it was the Batista’s job to act 
as a mediator between two opposing factions.  This balancing act had to be performed in 
between other sectors as well, not only in connection with sugar legislation.   
Because organized labor held stakes in so many different areas of the economy 
and population, Domínguez says it was of special importance, leading to the relationship 
that blossomed between Batista and the PCC.  The author did not explore the agreement 
in detail but did note its significance.  Labor had always been a source of irritation for 
                                                 
20      Domínguez, 110-33 
21      Domínguez, 84-88. 
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Batista as the early years of his rule, 1933 until 1936, were rife with politically and 
economically incited work stoppages.  By 1937, both sides were in need of something the 
other had.  The communists wanted access to power, and Batista could grant it.  Batista 
needed the peace and support that could be delivered unto him if the Communist Party 
was legalized and allowed to consolidate organized labor.  The two unlikely bedfellows 
came together in a pact in the spring of 1938.  The possible terms of the agreement will 
be discussed later, but the significance resided in the Communists’ new and central role 
in governance and the support given Batista by organized labor, the largest single interest 
group on the island.  Domínguez claimed that this cooperation was a key step towards the 
creation of a viable political system representing a majority of the population.22 
In summary, Jorge Domínguez viewed Fulgencio Batista not as an all-powerful 
military strongman ruling the island with a heavy hand, but as a cog, albeit the principal 
cog, in a larger Cuban political machine.  His interpretation of Batista’s role in the 
struggles between capital and labor reinforced the perception of him as a powerbroker.  
Further strengthening this point is his treatment of the interaction between Batista and the 
“puppet” presidents where the author gave them much more agency and responsibility 
than other historians have.23  Domínguez realized that Batista was a man among men.  
The others with whom Batista ran the government were often rich and powerful and from 
old families, some were even sons of the patriots of 1902.  It is terribly unlikely that 
Fulgencio Batista, a man of meager beginnings, a mere sergeant until 1933, could have 
immediately commanded total respect and authority from such old-guard patricians.  By 
interpreting Batista as a powerbroker between the various factions, Domínguez exhibited 
                                                 
22      Domínguez, 96. 
23      Domínguez, 78. 
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the give and take in Cuban politics and argued against the image of Batista as all-
powerful.  Further, he analyzed Batista on his own terms in the 1930’s, not as the 
caricatured figure later created by the revolutionaries.  This study will use a similar 
methodology as it allows a fuller understanding of the era. 
Another point on which this analysis will be based was succinctly noted by 
Robert Whitney in his work, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and 
Political Change 1920-1940.24  In his work he recognized how the historian’s choice of 
endpoint affects the way in which the author crafts the narrative.  Certain ideas and 
events gain and lose importance as the study unfolds.  To exemplify this notion, he 
pointed to the body of Cuban historians who view the island’s past simply as a prelude to 
the insurrection of 1952-1959.  Whitney noted how an interpretation of that sort tends to 
cast the shadow of the Revolution back upon the years that preceded it, obscuring certain 
factors in an effort to understand others.  By ending his study in 1940 with the drafting of 
the constitution and Batista’s election to the presidency, Whitney allowed himself to 
interpret the years of his concern in a context different from that of others.   
For example, when commenting on the Revolution of 1933, many historians use 
words such as “failed” or “frustrated.”  That interpretation has been propagated by 
revolutionaries who wish to claim descent from a failed social revolution. It is Whitney’s 
contention, and that of this study, that the 1934 overthrow of the Grau regime did not 
mark a return to the old order, but instead the beginning of a transition period from 
oligarchic rule to mass political participation. 
                                                 
24      Robert Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba : Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940, 
Envisioning Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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As the proletarianization of urban and rural workers persisted, the influence of 
caudillos, who, while often capitalist and entrepreneurial still exerted “extra-economic” 
power as a result of personal authority, reputation, and loyalty, declined.  The concept of 
the “modern state,” which rested on the idea that the population should be mobilized by 
state leaders in the cause of the nation, emerged from the ashes of the ancien regime, 
according to Whitney.  While the old order’s claims to legitimacy rested on real or 
imagined ties with past leaders and patriarchs, the “modern state” existed to promote the 
principles of democracy and nationhood.  By the late 1930’s, the goals of Cuban 
nationalism, emphasizing the creation of a sovereign, democratic state accurately 
representing and striving for the good of the population, began to coalesce with those of 
the state, and it “became the collective patrimony of society.”  These were the sentiments 
behind the constitutional consensus of 1940, which led to the inclusion of many of the 
demands of 1933.25 
A point where this study and that of Whitney converge concerns the treatment of 
Batista’s methods and motives.  One of Whitney’s main guidelines in his study was that 
he would take Batista at his word.  He assumed that Batista indeed felt inclined to lessen 
the plight of the worker and did not have ulterior motives when instituting his reforms.26  
This being the case, Whitney believed that Batista viewed himself as the guarantor of the 
revolutionary goals of 1933 and that he truly desired to create a democratic system in 
Cuba.  If these two issues are accepted as fact, Batista’s actions take on new meaning.   
During the years between 1934 and 1937 Cuba was in constant turmoil.  Strikes, 
riots, and political violence were the themes of the day.  Being the chief of the armed 
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forces and with no civil method to contain the situation, Batista allowed the violent 
repression of the protestors and activists in an effort to calm the scene.  According to 
Whitney, not until all the organizational autonomy gained by the popular classes was 
swept away could an “organic” democratic movement take hold.27  The author then noted 
Batista’s acceptance of idealism only when it was practical.  He quoted Batista stating 
that “all ideas are useless unless they can be put into practice.”28  For Whitney, the 
repression so prevalent from 1934 until 1937 was a product of Batista’s pragmatism.  He 
saw a problem and knew he could not attain his goals until it was solved, so he found a 
solution.  In Batista’s eyes mass repression was necessary for mass reform. 
This quality of pragmatism will serve as a central motive leading to the union 
between Batista and the PCC.  When he finally quelled all the unrest on the island, he 
needed a way to stabilize the situation.  Realizing violent means would only quiet the 
opposition temporarily, leaving deep undercurrents of discontent, Batista turned to the 
Communist Party.  Here, Whitney enunciated an argument Domínguez only implied.  
Despite still being illegal, the Party had strong connections in organized labor, its 
members occupying several posts in important and powerful unions.  Labor unions were 
the largest political groups on the island and were responsible for most of the strikes and 
other disturbances.  A relationship that reined in the workers could prove most beneficial 
to Batista.  This paper will argue that Batista’s realization of the PCC’s power and 
abilities concerning organized labor, combined with an internal shift in the Party’s tactics, 
led to the cooperation between the two.  As Whitney argued, this paper will contend that 
Batista was not a communist but saw in the PCC a means to an end. 
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In his biography, Fulgencio Batista: From Revolutionary to Strongman, Frank 
Argote-Freyre took many of the same conceptions of Batista offered by Whitney and 
Domínguez and applied them to Batista’s entire public career.  In his work, the first of a 
proposed two-volume set, Argote-Freyre traced Batista’s life from birth until 1940, the 
year of his presidential election.  In the preface, the author noted the existence of “many 
Batistas.”  He stated that the recognition of the multi-dimensionality of Batista would be 
a main theme in his work, and that he would avoid the cardboard cutout of Batista that 
our generation inherited from past histories.  In dealing with Batista’s role in the 
government, Argote-Freyre avoided the idea that Batista ruled with a supreme mandate.  
Instead of a military dictator, Argote-Freyre called Batista a “strong man.”29  He claimed 
that while Batista’s word carried great weight in Cuba, there were others who also 
wielded power on the island.  This is evident in his treatment of the overthrow of Grau.  
The author cited the numerous meetings Batista had with Grau, Mendieta, and U.S. 
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, in which Batista was forced to compromise with all sides 
to attain a viable situation.  Where many have claimed that Grau was forced out, Argote-
Freyre noted Grau’s decision to resign as long as his terms were met.30 Grau’s 
resignation, the insertion of Carlos Hevia as president for a short time, and the 
compromise that brought Mendieta to power are consistent with Jorge I. Domínguez’s 
portrayal of Batista as a powerbroker. 
Concerning Batista’s reforms of the late 1930’s, Argote-Freyre saw in them 
Batista’s desire to aid the Cuban poor, from which he claimed descent.  He noted the 
many occasions when Batista made high-minded statements about elevating the Cuban 
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poor, both materially and ideologically.31  In many ways he adhered to Whitney’s 
assertion that we must take Batista at his word when he spoke of his social goals.  
Argote-Freyre credited Batista with a social conscience, but also viewed his actions from 
a political point of view.  In keeping with his assertion of the “many Batistas,” Argote-
Freyre called the reforms a “power grab” by a leader who wished to occupy the position 
of Cuba’s benefactor.  The balance struck between Batista’s social and political goals is 
characteristic of Argote-Freyre’s work.  A main contribution is the idea that Batista’s 
agenda was far more complex than a desire for political power or the social advancement 
of the Cuban people.  Argote-Freyre’s interpretation demonstrates the shifting importance 
of these goals and how Batista was more or less driven by each depending on the 
situation.   
Overall, this study aims to challenge some of the images of Fulgencio Batista 
which were constructed in efforts to understand the Revolution of 1959.  The focus of the 
study, his relationship with the Communist party, stands strongly against the image of 
Batista as a puppet-president.  While during this time the U.S. did have relations with the 
communists due to the exigencies of World War II, State Department records show that 
Batista was far too close to the communists in the eyes of American policy makers.  In 
examining the relationship it will also become apparent that Batista was not the 
reactionary he is so often supposed to be.  Rather, he was a pragmatic man who mediated 
Cuban politics and used his power to push Cuba towards a nominally democratic system 
by the time he stepped down in 1944. 
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Chroniclers of Cuban history benefit from the fact that many of the functionaries 
in politics and society or those close to them later authored books about the events in 
which they took part.  Not excluded from this list is Batista himself.  After his overthrow 
in 1959, he wrote several books, the two most important of which are Respuesta, later 
reprinted in English as Cuba Betrayed,32 and Piedras Y Leyes, also reprinted in English as 
The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic.33  
As its original title, Respuesta (the Spanish word for “Answer”), suggests, Cuba 
Betrayed is Batista’s answer to how the Cuban Revolution succeeded.  In his first book 
written while in exile, Batista painted himself as a victim of Castro’s propaganda, which 
tarnished his image among the Cuban population.  He cited the damage done to his 
regime by the protests and demonstrations held at the slightest provocation by supporters 
of Castro’s movement (M-26-7).34  He referred to the Herbert Matthews interview of 
Fidel Castro in the New York Times as particularly injurious to his regime, claiming the 
interview created the legend of Fidel Castro as well as demoralized federal troops. 
An interesting aspect of Cuba Betrayed is the commonalities it shares with 
Castro’s History Will Absolve Me.  Batista attempted to do to Castro what Castro had 
done to him at the trial for the Moncada attack.  Batista’s narrative often revolved around 
the acts of terrorism and sabotage committed by the M-26-7 before and after January 
1959.  Just as Castro complained of government persecution of political dissidents, 
Batista cited violence perpetrated against those who refused to support Castro, such as 
workers who failed to strike.  Further, the author noted other violence perpetuated by 
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fidelistas, ranging from assassinations to bombings of public buildings and events.  As 
well, he echoed Castro’s accusations of political repression by citing the extreme 
censorship of the press and the curtailment of personal freedoms.35 
Batista claimed that the final blow to his government was the arms embargo 
directed against the regime by the United States.  “When the causes are completely 
revealed and the sources and magnitude of the traffic of arms are known with certainty, it 
will be seen to what degree the entire order of the traditional international system broke 
down.”36  Batista felt that a main cause of his overthrow was the withdrawal of support 
by the United States, culminating with the arms embargo enacted in March, 1958.  He 
supported this by quoting a secret U.S. Senate subcommittee meeting at which Earl E.T. 
Smith, former ambassador to Cuba, testified that it was unwise to have discontinued the 
arms shipments.  According to Smith, Batista had no chance of recovery after the 
embargo because the armed forces and the population knew the United States would no 
longer offer its support.  He portrayed himself as the one man who saw it all coming but 
the world ignored his denunciations of Castro’s communist intentions.  Batista seemed to 
feel that he was not at fault for the downfall of his government because he had done so 
much for the advancement of his people.  In his mind, he was the victim of a terrible 
betrayal by the armed forces, the population, and American policy. 
Aside from being a telling reference into the mind of the man, Batista contributed 
much to our understanding of the 1950’s, providing extensive information.   The book is 
filled with statistics and testimonies concerning the situation of the population before and 
after the Revolution, but the mass of facts are somewhat disjointed, leaving any analysis 
                                                 
35      Batista y Zaldívar, Cuba Betrayed  30, 52-71. 
36      Batista y Zaldívar, Cuba Betrayed  142. 
 22 
to the reader.  He pointed out all the advances made during his tenures as head of state, 
but failed to address the discontent that apparently spread across the island.  By 
dismissing the growing opposition to his government among the non-belligerent sectors, 
Batista took away agency from the people as actors in the Revolution and gave it all to 
Castro.  He essentially argued that his downfall was a function of Castro’s influence and 
had no connection to the will of the people.  This is the final plank in the argument in 
which Batista suggests the people of Cuba were happy with the status quo and it was 
Castro, and the menace of the Communist International, that forced the Revolution upon 
them. 
The second book Batista published during his exile after the Revolution was 
Piedras y Leyes, soon translated into English as The Growth and Decline of the Cuban 
Republic.37  He began this book by recognizing, as Louis Pérez did, the process 
undertaken by Fidel Castro of altering history so as to gain legitimacy.  Batista did not 
make use of the same quote by Karl Marx to explain Castro’s efforts, but the wording 
suggested that Batista saw in the early 1960’s the process Pérez later identified in the 
early 1980’s.38 
Batista’s argument in The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic was a 
continuation of that in Cuba Betrayed.  However, where Cuba Betrayed was an attack on 
Castro and his methods, this work praised the “economic and social developments and 
the… legislative work and constructive accomplishments of [Batista’s] various 
administrations.”39  The author sketched some of the salient events of his first regime and 
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the Auténtico years that led to his second coup in March of 1952.  He again spoke of the 
accomplishments of his government and pointed out how the Auténticos, whom he 
repeatedly labeled gangsters and accused of corruption, missed the chance that had been 
given them to be remembered as great statesmen. 
In explaining the coup of March 1952, Batista claimed that it was President 
Carlos Prío Socarras who held ultimate responsibility.  Batista cited a meeting with Dr. 
Juan J. Remos, a spokesperson for Prío, at which Remos told Batista that unless Carlos 
Hevia, the Auténtico candidate, made great gains in support before the upcoming 
elections they would be won by the Ortodoxo Party.  This caused Prío great angst as the 
Ortodoxos earlier stated that upon their electoral victory, they would set up a “people’s 
court” at which he would stand trial for corruption.  To prevent the Ortodoxos’ electoral 
victory Prío planned a coup to remain in power.  Batista told Remos that this would cause 
much bloodshed and divide Cuba irreparably as his administration did not hold the 
support of the Cuban population and only remained in power due to its constitutionality.  
He told Remos to plead with Prío to change his course.  Despite this advice, Remos later 
returned with word that Prío had not changed his mind.  According to Batista, this was 
the ultimate motivation for his overthrow of the constitutional Prío regime.  Batista saw 
himself as the only one with broad enough support to save the island from an 
insurrection.40 
After establishing this point, Batista went on to note the social advances made 
during his administrations, citing especially statistics concerning education, standard of 
living, and employment, all of which were among the best in the hemisphere.  Again, 
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Batista implicitly asked why, if the people of Cuba were happy and enjoyed the fruits of 
good government, they accepted so willingly the regime of Fidel Castro.  To answer this 
question he, as in Cuba Betrayed, cited the insurgency and propaganda espoused by the 
Castro’s group and the Communist International. 
An individual who unabashedly opposed the Batista regime was Ricardo Adam y 
Silva.  A member of the officer corps deposed in the Sergeants’ Revolt, Adam y Silva 
was part of the meager force that defended and later surrendered the Hotel Nacional to 
Batista’s army.  He gave his account of the events of 1933 in his book, La Gran 
Mentira.41  As suggested by its title, Adam y Silva sought to unravel the “big lie” 
perpetrated by Batista and his partisans concerning the Revolution of 1933. 
In his thoroughly documented volume, Adam y Silva asserted that Batista, 
contrary to the standard version of the Revolution of 1933, was not acting on behalf of 
the enlisted men when he suddenly took control over Camp Columbia, but was carrying 
out a plot hatched during the final days of the Machado regime.  The plan, as stated, was 
that the sergeants would overthrow the reformist-minded Grau regime and re-install a 
military dictatorship in the same vein as the one presided over by Machado.  Many of the 
officials of the ousted regime would be allowed to reenter the country and even regain 
some of their old positions.  The author portrayed Batista as the pawn of imperialist 
forces who still supported Machado’s lenient regulation of business.42  The author 
however, chose to ignore entirely Batista’s reformist tendencies as well as his anti-
Machado activities that began as early as 1931 when he became a member of a founding 
cell of the ABC, which fought the regime desperately.  While Adam y Silva’s accusations 
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concerning the officials of Machado’s government did eventually ring true (many 
Machado officials returned to their former jobs and even Machado himself was allowed 
to return to Cuba43) it is necessary to discount somewhat the author’s vehement 
indictment of Batista as he is clearly biased. 
This paper seeks to stay away from interpretations with such a strong possibility 
of being skewed in one direction because of the personal and professional affiliations 
retained by the authors.  These works are invaluable for their insight into the minds of the 
actors involved in government during the era and for what they implicitly say.  However, 
they must be viewed with attention to the predisposition of their authors.  Further, the 
date of publication should be taken into account, especially concerning Batista’s works.  
Both of the books considered here were published in the first half of the 1960’s within 
five years of Batista’s ouster.  One must question what the author sought to achieve in 
these two works.  Both of these books amount to a refutation of blame for the onslaught 
of the Castro regime, which had declared itself communist in nature by early 1961.  
Because of the Cold War mood of the 1960’s, many historians, and Batista himself, 
downplayed the relationship he maintained with the Communist Party, one that was quite 
cozy by the end of his presidential term in 1944.  Frank Argote-Freyre said of the 
alliance, that it was “a politically inconvenient one, both for the Cuban Revolution and 
for members of the Cuban exile community who considerd themselves batistianos.  As a 
result, it has been largely ignored in the historiography.”44
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Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar: His Youth and Career until 1933 
 
 
Fulgencio Batista is an enigmatic figure.  As large a role as he played in the 
governing of Cuba during the middle third of the twentieth century, it is surprising that 
only recently has a scholarly biography of the sergeant-turned-president been completed.  
He was not a political idealist, like many of those who surrounded him, but a clever 
tactician and pragmatist who was able to adapt quickly to the capricious nature of Cuban 
politics.  In 1933, when he entered the political scene, his powerbase was primarily 
composed of the army and police forces.  His political skill, however, allowed him to 
make alliances with other people and groups that did have mass followings, thereby 
guaranteeing him a stake in politics for the better part of a quarter century.45 
Ruben Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar was born in 1901 to Belisario Batista and his 
wife Carmela Zaldívar.  Belisario fought in the war for Cuban independence as a sergeant 
under General Jose Maceo.  On the occasion of the birth of their first child, the young 
couple lived at the town of Veguitas, near the sugar port of Antilla, which served the 
United Fruit Company.  They were employed, like most in the region, in the cutting of 
sugarcane and were of the lowest social class.  Batista’s parents seem to have been 
mulatto but may have had some indigenous blood as well.  Batista’s youth was somewhat 
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disorganized.  As a young child he attended a public school at Banes.  Later he went to a 
Quaker school at night and cut cane during the day.46 
In 1915, when Fulgencio was fourteen, his mother died.  This was a terrible blow 
to the youth who was quite close to her.  After her death the desire to quit the cane fields 
propelled him to leave home.  Also at this time he dropped his first name, Rubén.  His 
mother’s pet name for him was “Beno,” but he decided that to honor her he would never 
allow anyone to call him by that name again.  From then on he was simply Fulgencio.  
His first stop after leaving home was some forty miles away at Holguín on the farm of an 
uncle.  He stayed for several weeks, but was unhappy with the conditions so he moved on 
to the town of San German where he took a job as a water boy with a work crew.  
Employed in the preparation of the land for a new cane plantation, Batista quickly 
learned all he could about the cultivation of the crop.  He returned to Banes and had 
thoughts of becoming a cane farmer himself, but his restlessness pushed him to leave as 
soon as he had enough money.47 
While he would return intermittently to work in the cane fields, never again would 
he live at the family bohio.  Over the next several years, Batista occupied a number of 
jobs.  His first contact with the army came at Dumois.  A contingent of the army was 
posted there because of a threatened strike.  Batista found work with the army doing odd 
jobs such as washing bridles.   At other times he worked as a tailor’s and then a 
carpenter’s apprentice, and a hand boy at a barbershop.  At Holguín he finally achieved a 
goal he had set several years before.  The railroaders he met while living at Dumois had 
impressed him with their stories of far away places and their worldliness.  After several 
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months hanging around Holguín, he found a job with Consolidated Railways as a 
brakeman.  Those were happy times when he was traveling up and down the 
Consolidated Railways system, and he continued working there until he was twenty.48 
Throughout his youth, Batista endeavored to educate himself.  He was known on 
the railway for his propensity to pass his days in his room reading rather then partying 
and drinking as did many of those with whom he worked.  In April of 1921, Batista 
decided his education could progress no farther atop a boxcar so he joined the army and 
was assigned to the First Battalion of the Forth Company of Infantry at Camp Columbia, 
near Havana.  Batista liked army life.  His room, board, and clothing were taken care of 
for him, and he had access to the camp library, giving him opportunities to study a 
myriad of subjects.  He focused mainly on law studies.  As he did not have the high 
school credits necessary to enter law school, he simply read all the law books he could 
get his hands on.  To improve his vocational opportunities, Batista took up shorthand and 
stenography.  He enrolled in the San Mario College in Havana to take night classes.  
There, the director of the college recognized Batista’s seriousness about his studies.  
When Batista finished his first term in the army, he was offered and took a job as an 
assistant professor.  He was later promoted to the position of full professor and taught 
commercial grammar.  Batista remained at the college for several months but soon re-
enlisted in the army, joining the rural guard.  He realized his ambition might be better 
served in the army rather than as a professor.49 
In the rural guard Batista was assigned to Finca Maria, the farm of President 
Zayas, near the town of Wajay.  It was a good assignment; the duties were light and he 
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had access to a large library.  As well, Batista met many important politicians and 
statesmen and had the opportunity to talk with the president himself at times.  He stayed 
at the finca until the end of Zayas’s term when he transferred to the regular army.  During 
this time he was stationed at the Atarés fortress near Havana and later at Castillo de la 
Fuerza in the city center.  These years were invaluable for Batista as he gained 
experience in the operation and politics of the army, while being assigned to serve as the 
secretary for the Inspector General, Colonel Federico Rasco y Ruiz.  Also during this 
time he was promoted to corporal.50 
In the last year of the presidency of Gerardo Machado (1924-1933), Batista was 
promoted to sergeant stenographer of the seventh district at La Cabana.  It was at this 
point that his career really took off.  From his position, he worked for the councils of war 
and was privy to information others were not.  He began to see that the regime, known as 
the Machadato, was collapsing, and he joined a cell of the ABC revolutionary 
organization, (ABC).  The cell he joined was primarily dedicated to acquiring 
information and passing it on to others.  His work provided the basis for articles, 
pamphlets, and political tracts for dissemination throughout the organization.  As a 
stenographer in a military court, which had begun to try civilians accused of political 
crimes as well, he was a valued informant.  Batista may have been part of multiple cells 
of the ABC or connected with another revolutionary group.  Suffice it to say that while 
not a leader, he was indeed a member of the opposition against Machado.  His 
participation in the ABC raises questions concerning Batista’s ideology at the time as the 
ABC attacked the regime from the right, using terrorist tactics.  Batista would later find 
                                                 
50      Chester, 18. 
 30 
his own government the victim of such rightist venom and himself on the left.  Reasons 
for Batista’s association with the ABC are varied.  At the time the ABC was the most 
powerful and most effective group acting against Machado.  Frank Argote-Freyre, the 
author of the recently released biography of Batista, claimed that as a youth, his ideology 
was only partly formed.  Batista may have joined the ABC less for its ideology and more 
because he saw it as the best avenue of opposition to Machado.  Also, Batista’s political 
foresight made him realize that as the Machadato fell, it would be beneficial to have 
connections among the opposition.51 
The debate about when Batista began conspiring against the Machado regime is 
considerable.  The Sergeants’ Revolt of 4 September 1933 should be seen as the 
continuation of conspiracies in which Batista had been involved since 1931.  With his 
privileged position in the army, Batista gained firsthand experience in the art of 
conspiracy.  Cuban politics was such that “the formation of a new government was 
merely a prelude to new conspiracies by those left outside the ruling coalition.”  By the 
end of the Machadato, the majority of the armed forces conspired with one group or 
another.52   
On the night of 3 September, Batista and a group of soldiers ranked sergeants and 
below, met to discuss grievances they had with the army, namely poor pay and housing 
conditions and a rumored cut in the numbers of enlisted men.  Their conspiracy began as 
one with defensive aims.  In the aftermath of the installation of the provisional 
government, maintenance of position and power was the goal.  Originally, the conspiracy 
was in response to rumors of decreases in pay and numbers of enlisted men.  In the early 
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stages of the movement another sergeant, Pablo Rodríguez, shared power with Batista.  
The president of the Enlisted Men’s Club, he was especially popular and proved to be a 
powerful ally.  Supporters of both Batista and Rodríguez argue about the actual division 
of power between the two men.  Each side claims to be the mastermind of the operation.  
According to one of the original conspirators, Ramón Cruz Vidal, Batista’s leadership 
was never in question.  “He was the one who knew the most.”53 
Batista’s first public speech was memorable.  Upon the fall of Machado, in the 
Atarés fortress, the tortured bodies of Sergeant Miguel Ángel Hernández, Félix Alpízar, a 
student, and Margarito Iglesias, a labor leader were discovered.  The three men became 
martyrs to the anti-Machado cause, and their funerals drew the attention of everyone on 
the island, except the military brass.  The military high-ups did not comprehend the 
significance of the funerals and sent only a small, low-ranking delegation to Sergeant 
Hernández’s funeral.  This poor showing of support was considered disgraceful by the 
enlisted men and others in attendance.  Due to the lack of a high ranking officer to 
eulogize Sergeant Hernández, those gathered asked Batista to speak.  Batista harshly 
condemned the military leadership for the lack of compassion they showed towards the 
funerals, even boldly proclaiming that the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) would one 
day lead a democratic revolution.  The threatening nature of the speech was noticed by 
his superiors, placing Batista in greater danger, but it also increased his visibility and 
popularity among the enlisted men.  Batista would later comment that the speech was a 
“tactical error,” but it consolidated his leadership of the movement.  Given the political 
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cunning Batista showed throughout his life, one must consider the possibility that the 
impassioned speech was a calculated risk rather that an emotional outburst.54     
Equally important at the Sergeant Hernández’s funeral, Batista was introduced to 
important civilian leaders.  Sergio Carbó, the influential journalist, was one such leader.  
Carbó was a top intellectual among the students and workers. He stood for democratic 
principles and the alleviation of the plight of the Cuban poor.  His relationship with 
Batista would be critical in the coming weeks.  It also provided some information about 
Batista’s personal ideology at this time.  Sergio Carbó was a reformer, and his newspaper 
La Semana was dedicated to social issues.  For Batista to choose as one of his closest 
advisors a man of such leanings, they must have had much in common.  Batista further 
suggested his social conscience when he signed the Proclaimation of the Revolutionaries 
along side seventeen civilians.  The document was moderate in tone but reformist in 
intent.55 
As the chosen day for the revolt approached, the ranks of the conspirators swelled 
until they were forced to meet in large venues such as theaters.  On 3 September loose 
lips allowed Captain Mario Torres Menier to find out about the meeting scheduled for the 
next day.  When Batista arrived at Camp Columbia the morning of 4 September he was 
met by the Torres Menier.  The situation had taken a new, more dangerous direction, but 
Batista, as he would do several more times before the coup was complete, used his 
political cunning keep the movement from collapsing.  He invited Torres Menier to 
attend the meeting and hear the enlisted men’s complaints, but at the same time he asked 
fellow conspirators to contact allies at military installations around Havana and request 
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they come to Camp Columbia armed and ready for battle.  Batista’s invitation to Torres 
Menier was crucial as it suggested that the enlisted men were not secretly conspiring, but 
openly letting their complaints be heard.  The army chief, General Sanguily, upon hearing 
of the events from Torres Menier only told him to attend the meeting and obtain a list of 
complaints.  The officialdom failed to understand the gravity of the situation. 
If there was any questions as to the leadership of the movement, the meeting of 
enlisted men attended by Torres Menier put an end to them.  Batista stalled for time until 
the meeting room was entirely full of sergeants and enlisted men.  He complained of the 
poor treatment enlisted men received and the lack of credit they got concerning the 
overthrow of Machado.  He said that the sergeants’ motivation extended beyond material 
issues, claiming that the soldiers’ dignity was at stake.  The meeting escalated into a 
raucous affair complete with chants of “Viva Batista.”  However, to buy more time, 
Batista gave assurances to Captain Torres Menier that the men would still follow the 
officers’ orders.  Torres Menier left the meeting after calling for a list of grievances for 
the military higher-ups to contemplate.56 
When Torres Menier called again to request the complaint list he was told that 
another meeting was scheduled for later that night at which no officers would be allowed; 
there the list would supposedly be drafted.  While the officers waited for the list that 
would never come, Batista called allies around Havana and invited them to the meeting.  
His list of calls included his friend Carbó and the leaders of the Directorio Estudentil 
Universitario (DEU).  This was important because it gives way to Batista’s ideological 
leanings again.  It is significant that his closest advisors were the student and labor 
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leaders and not members of the ABC.  In fact, by this point Batista had broken most of 
his ties with the conservative group even though they would support him intermittently in 
the future. 
The night of 4 September 1933 saw a meeting of hundreds of enlisted men at 
which Batista openly declared the revolt.  The movement was at a crossroads.  Over the 
next several hours they would take control of most of the armed forces, but it would 
become clear that he could not oust the officer corps without toppling the Céspedes 
government.  Possibly feeling a little in over their heads, the soldiers were unsure how to 
proceed.  If the coup failed, there would certainly be retribution by the officer corps 
against the mutineers that could lead to court martial, and possibly execution.  At this 
point the student groups provided the means for the legitimization of the overthrow.  The 
coalition that emerged between the students and the sergeants was and example of 
Batista’s ability and willingness to make pragmatic political alliances to further his 
ambitions.  This relationship served both sides.  It offered the soldiers pardon, and, in the 
absence of the officer corps, it allowed them a chance to advance in rank.  As well, the 
anti-government forces gained access to power. 
From this civil-military agreement came a revolutionary junta composed of five 
men, Ramón Grau San Martin, a well known anti-Machado physician and university 
professor, Porfírio Franca, a banker, the lawyer José Miguel Irisarri, a criminal law 
professor, Guillermo Portéla, and the journalist and author, Sergio Carbó.  This junta, 
known as the Pentarchy, announced a plan for a new Cuba including calls for national 
sovereignty and abolition of the Platt Amendment and the establishment of a modern 
democracy.  The group promoted Batista to the position of Jefe del Ejercito, or chief of 
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the Army.  Within a week, the Pentarchy collapsed under student pressure, and Grau 
became president.57 
So began the Batista era of Cuban history.  The Sergeants’ Revolt of 1933 
introduced Fulgencio Batista to Cuban politics.  It also allowed Batista to exhibit some of 
the political skill he would show throughout his career.  In the planning stages of the 
revolt, Batista used his education in conspiracy that he gained during his time with the 
ABC and in the military courts.  He put his sense of timing to use at the funeral of 
Sergeant Miguel Ángel Hernández, where he gave enough information about his plans to 
push on the movement and gather adherents but not enough to arouse serious suspicion 
among the officers.  His ability to immediately understand cause and effect of any event 
helped him deal with Captain Torres Menier in a way that consolidated his leadership and 
bought more time.  Finally, Batista showed his propensity for making alliances.  
Throughout his career, Batista needed to join with civilian groups to gain influence 
outside the military.  His alliance with the DEU, though short-lived, suggested his 
willingness to compromise so as to further his goals and gave insight into the moderate 
reformist platform he would follow during his time in power.
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The Communist Party of Cuba: From its Origins until 1933 
 
 
In 1925, only a year before Batista joined the regular army, the Partido 
Comunista de Cuba (PCC) was founded.  In the early 1920’s, the first groups sprang up 
who called themselves communists.  In August of 1925 these scattered pockets became 
unified under one leadership.  The first secretary general of the party was Julio Antonio 
Mella.  His tenure was rather short time as he was soon arrested and deported to Mexico 
by the Machado government, the party’s main antagonist in those years.  The PCC was 
formed during the years in which Machado consolidated his grip on the country and 
became a dictator.  As political freedoms were tightly restricted, the PCC was forced to 
go underground. 
During the 1920’s, the communists used the familiar tactic of the front 
organization.  The most important such organization was the Liga Anti-Imperialista 
(Anti-Imperialist League) through which they protested the government’s connection 
with the United States as well as other issues they found to be contrary to their goals.  
The party focused the majority of its efforts on the trade union movement.  The railroad 
workers, weavers, and tobacco worker’s unions all contained notable “revolutionary 
fractions” organized and led by PCC members.  By the late 1920’s the party virtually 
took over the Cuban labor federation, the Confederación Nacional Obrera Cubana 
(CNOC) placing one of its own, Cesar Vilár, in the secretary general’s position. 
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As resistance to the Machado regime grew, the PCC became more active in the 
campaign to oust the president-turned-dictator.  Although the CNOC was outlawed, it 
held itself together and continued to engage in strikes.  In 1930 it called for a one-day 
general strike to exhibit labor’s discontent with the regime.  Later that year it organized 
an important May Day protest.  By late 1932, the party had organized and led important 
work stoppages in the textile, shoe making, and cigar industries.  These efforts 
culminated in a strike in the sugar industry in early 1933.  Communists claimed that 
20,000 workers participated in the action.  The tangible result of the strike was the 
creation of the Sindicato Nacional Obrero de la Industria Azucarera (SNOIA), the first 
national sugar worker’s union on the island. 
Later that year the communists played a significant role in the general strike that 
dealt the final blow to the Machado government.  They originally strongly supported the 
strike but quizzically, just before the ouster of Machado, they futilely urged its end.  
Some have claimed that the party realized if the strike gained much more momentum it 
would lead to armed insurrection which in turn would lead to U.S. intervention.  To avoid 
the landing of American troops, they struck a deal with Machado.  Others claim that the 
party leaders agreed to call off the strike if Machado granted the party and the CNOC 
legal status and gave the PCC government money to carry out its plans.58  Their call to 
end the strike went unheard, and Machado was forced out of office by August.  Whatever 
the motives, the arrangement between the two factions points to the political flexibility of 
the party, a characteristic that would become evident again in the mid to late 1930’s. 
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Significant to this study, the PCC’s role in the coup of 4 September was minor.  
The communists offered their support, but they were not warmly accepted and possibly 
even rejected outright.59  It is likely that their shady dealings with Machado on the eve of 
his downfall were remembered.  This same factor, combined with the Communist 
International’s (Comintern) shift towards popular front politics, would allow the PCC to 
make a pact with Batista five years later.   
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Era of Conflict: 1933 – 1937 
 
Grau’s Provisional Government and the Strike of 1935 
 
 
In the unstable situation that followed the fall of Machado, the various parties and 
factions scrambled for support and to find their place in the new Cuban government.  
Batista and the army formed a coalition with the students that was a cornerstone of 
support for the Grau administration.  Sumner Welles’s charge that the new government 
was “frankly communistic” could not have been further from the truth.60  In fact, the PCC 
bitterly opposed Grau.  The bourgeois, intellectual physician still represented the “last 
hope of the ruling class” to the party.  It chided Grau’s revolutionary credentials, noting 
that his government still stood “in the shadow of the American dreadnaught, the U.S.S. 
Mississippi and thirty-seven other fighting vessels.”61  At this point, a major plank in the 
PCC’s platform was anti-imperialism.  They considered Grau too close to the pro-
American elite.   
Though unrest continued throughout the three and one half months of the Grau 
regime, the largest uprising came upon the return of the ashes of Julio Antonio Mella 
from Mexico.  Mella, a founder of the PCC, was assassinated in 1929 in Mexico City.  
Most blame Machado’s thugs for the murder.  His ashes returned to Havana on 29 
September 1933.  Initially, the PCC was given permission to organize a march in honor 
of the event, but shortly before, Interior Minister Antonio Guiteras rescinded the 
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permission and dispatched soldiers to the area.  They were met by a large crowd of 
communist supporters waving red flags in spite of the government’s degree that no such 
demonstration should take place.  The responsibility for the first shot fired remains 
unclaimed, but by the end of the day the ashes had been lost, the monument destroyed, 
and the red flags captured.  Six people were killed and twenty-seven were wounded.62 
Leading up to and after the overthrow of Grau, the PCC was quite involved in the 
labor unrest that kept the nation in a constant state of turbulence.  Some even gave the 
communists a large part of the responsibility for the fall of Grau, saying that their 
continuous activities in the countryside persuaded the U.S. to withhold recognition, and 
lack thereof pushed Grau out of office.63  Whatever the case, the party was active in 
strikes in the medical profession, among teachers and employees of the Department of 
Public Instruction, and in walk-outs among rail and textile workers in Havana, all calling 
for better conditions and the formation of a workers’ and peasants’ government.64 
During the Grau administration Batista remained relatively quiet concerning 
civilian affairs.  However, in two different incidents, he consolidated his position in the 
army.  The first incident was the Battle of the Hotel Nacional.  Since 4 September, the 
deposed officer corps gathered at the hotel.  From there, they openly plotted to overthrow 
Grau and courted U.S. support by attempting to reconstitute the Céspedes government, 
but the ousted president would have none of it.  The hotel represented a bed of opposition 
in the middle of Havana, and therefore, had to be dealt with.  At the suggestion of Interior 
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Minister Guiteras, Batista made ready for an attack on the hotel.  On the morning of 2 
October, the firing began.  With Guiteras by his side, Batista directed a campaign that 
lasted until four in the afternoon.  As a military operation, the attack was a failure for the 
enlisted men, who lost as much as one hundred men compared to only two deaths among 
the officers.  As a political issue, however, it was a success.  With the old officer corps 
dispersed, Batista greatly strengthened his control over the military.  By this point, the 
colonel from such modest beginnings was the most powerful man on the island.65 
A second attempt to oust Batista from the head of the military and get rid of Grau 
began in late October.  Some felt that Batista was wrong to have done away with the old 
officer corps and that the Grau government was destabilizing the military.  The ABC was 
also eager to strike against Batista as he had abandoned them after the fall of Machado.  
The conspirators had supporters in many of the military installations around Havana, 
even Camp Columbia.  The leadership of the operation was divided among four men, 
Lieutenant José Barríentos of the Aviation Corps, Major Ciro Leonard, formerly in 
charge of the San Ambrosia Barracks, Second Lieutenant Pedro Gener Núñez of the 
Presidential Guard, and Colonel Juan Blas Hernández, former guerilla fighter against 
Machado. 
The target date was 8 November, a time when Batista was supposed to be 
traveling outside Havana.  Unfortunately for the conspirators, Batista gained knowledge 
of the plot and remained at Camp Columbia to ready for the upcoming fight.  Knowing 
that Batista was aware of the planned revolt, the attackers began their assault early.  Just 
after midnight, Camp Columbia was attacked from the air, causing chaos and confusion 
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throughout Havana.  In reality, but three planes participated in the attack, only one of 
which released its payload of ten bombs.  At the same time, rebels on the ground, largely 
made up of ABC members, marched through Havana capturing government buildings 
and police stations.  By the morning the rebels controlled much of the city.   
The battle began to swing to the government side when Batista regained total 
control over Camp Columbia.  After this, soldiers began pouring into Havana, and things 
began to look grim for the rebels.  By late afternoon, they were concentrated in two 
positions, the San Ambrosia Barracks and the Atarés fortress.  By the evening they were 
forced to abandon San Ambrosia as it was being shelled from the Havana Bay by the 
cruiser Cuba.  Colonel Blas Hernández was against concentrating at Atarés, fearing 
another Hotel Nacional.  However, the rebels would make their final stand there. 
The fighting at Atarés continued until 4 p.m. the next day, when the rebels 
surrendered.  The killing, however, did not stop with the flying of the white flag.  
According to eyewitness accounts, several groups of prisoners were executed outside the 
fortress, including Blas Hernández.  Sporadic fighting continued around Havana for a few 
days, but the rebellion was basically over with the fall of Atarés.  The suppression of the 
insurrection further strengthened Batista’s position and unified parts of the Grau 
government that had, until then, been divided by infighting. 66 
With his position as chief of military now confirmed, Batista watched the 
administration waver from holding general support to being the object of outright 
opposition, and he was in contact with Sumner Welles.  They met often, and each had the 
other’s ear.  As the end of 1933 drew near, Colonel Batista doubtlessly realized that the 
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U.S. government was not entirely pleased with the provisional government in Havana and 
it would not be at all opposed to a new government under his control.  As well, domestic 
support for Grau melted away quickly.  Most of the public refused to support Grau’s 
administration or his calls for the election of a constitutional assembly because of his 
minority government.  Even the student groups, once a main source of Grau’s support, 
disassociated themselves with him as early as 6 January 1934.67  These political 
desertions, combined with the lack of U.S. recognition, resulted in the coup staged by 
Batista on 15 January 1934.  By that date it became clear to Grau he could no longer 
maintain power.  He agreed to resign, but only to the junta that put him in office back in 
September.  Batista put together a group of men which resembled the original junta, but 
included more military men and excluded several original members who were currently 
his enemies.  The junta was supposed to choose a new president.  Several plans were 
discussed, one even proposed to make Grau the new army chief.  Eventually, the group 
chose the engineer, Carlos Hevia. 
Hevia remained in power for less than forty-eight hours as he did not have the full 
support of any faction involved. Batista, once again, read the political situation correctly.  
Before Hevia took power Batista realized that he only had enough support to act as a 
transitory president until another came along.  By 16 January, group after group rejected 
Hevia’s pleas to join his coalition.  Batista was proven right.  On 17 January he called for 
Hevia to resign.  On 18 January, Hevia did so, and Cuba was without a president until 
Secretary of State Manuel Márquez Sterling agreed to take the position on a temporary 
basis some four hours later.  Márquez Sterling’s charge during his brief time in office was 
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to head a cross-party meeting of political leaders to find a new president.  Batista 
suggested Mendieta as he was the last man standing of those originally discussed by the 
junta that accepted Grau’s resignation.  Mendieta, however, not wanting to look as 
though he were installed by the army, refused this logic.  With this in mind, Márquez 
Sterling convened a meeting of Mendieta supporters and allies to make official his 
selection as provisional president.  This cleared the way for Mendieta to take the 
position.68 
For the communists, the change in government meant little.  They continued to 
cause disruption throughout the countryside and in urban centers.  Almost daily the press 
reported the arrest of “alleged communists” and the discovery of communist propaganda 
in the offices of labor groups and opposition parties.69  The party’s influence expanded 
rapidly during this period.  The communist-led CNOC brought most of the labor unions 
into its fold by early 1934 and began to wield real power, often calling for strikes and 
protests.  Further, the party utilized its characteristically strong organizational skills to 
place representatives in every mill as well as in key positions in most industries.  It might 
have been at this point that Batista first noticed the potential power of the PCC.  By late 
January 1934 the party had already demonstrated its influence by instigating numerous 
strikes through its control over the CNOC.  Batista told U.S. Ambassador Jefferson 
Caffery that he would like to close the offices of the CNOC in all mill towns as it was the 
primary catalyst in bringing about unrest and harassment of non-striking workers.  
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Caffery agreed, noting the emergence of a very efficient organization during the previous 
months.70 
The year 1934 was, like 1933, dominated by strikes and demonstrations.  Political 
violence was the theme of the day with all sides being equally guilty of atrocities such as 
kidnappings, bombings, and murders.  The communists followed classical patterns of 
cellular organization and advocated a new world after the collapse of capitalism, but they 
do not seem to have been as active as other groups in terms of violence.71  The party 
horded large quantities of arms and ammunition, but only fringe groups such as one 
calling itself T.N.T. actually participated in armed insurrection.  In all of 1934 the State 
Department did not once cite the Communist Party as responsible for bombings in 
Havana, whereas the ABC and student groups were blamed numerous times.72  The party 
instead focused its energy towards instigating strikes and demonstrations. 
While some opposition groups were more violent, virtually all of them 
participated in strike activity during 1934.  This led up to the general strike of March 
1935.  The culmination of more than a year of labor unrest, large scale walk-outs first 
began in the last weeks of February, when several hundred thousand teachers and 
students walked out demanding school breakfasts, an increase in teacher’s salaries, and 
better equipment.  The unions connected with Grau and former Minister of the Interior 
Antonio Guiteras’s, group Joven Cuba (Young Cuba), were the first to join in with a 
sympathy strike.  On 6 March radical students bombed a custom house and the Treasury 
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Department building in attempts to promote a general revolutionary strike against the 
government officially headed by Mendieta but propped up by the army chief, Batista.  
Batista called the move “disgraceful,” arguing that a civilized nation like Cuba should not 
be subject to such acts.  He also warned that the government would take a strong position 
against any more such violence.73  The mayor of Havana, Guillermo Belt, found a 
particularly curious way of downplaying the work stoppages, commenting that the 
government would end the conflict “using only rifles, machine guns and cannons would 
not be necessary,” meaning a full-scale military action was beyond the scope of the 
uprising.74  Two days later he would be proven wrong. 
After the bombings of the customs house and Treasury Department building, 
employees of the Treasury and Labor Departments walked out, joining the students and 
teachers in opposition to the government.  By 8 March, employees of five more 
governmental departments, including those of education, justice, communication, 
agriculture, and commerce joined the Treasury and Labor Department employees in 
abandoning their jobs.  Employees of seven of twelve governmental departments were 
then antagonistic to the government.  Havana was soon paralyzed as most public sector 
employees and many of those in private businesses failed to work.75 
The government response was not long in coming.  By 9 March, Mendieta 
suspended all constitutional guarantees and declared a state of martial law in Havana.  
Batista named Colonel José Eleutario Pedraza as the military governor of the province.  
The army, already on notice, received the call to arms at 10 p.m. on the night of 10 March 
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and a state of siege was declared by 11 p.m. that same night.  There was firing all over 
the city including the famous Prado and Malecon Drive.76  In a state of excitement and 
caution, the government troops enacted harsh tactics to quell the disturbances.  Already, 
the government replaced the Constitution by a “Plan of Eight Points,” which among other 
repressive acts, gave the army and police almost unlimited authority.77  Strike breakers 
were given immunity in the case that they killed strikers in the line of duty.  Conversely, 
the death penalty was enacted for crimes such as sabotage of the water and power utilities 
as well as firing on government employees and functionaries.  Even possessing 
explosives or inflammables could get one executed.78  The dreaded ley de fuga or law of 
flight was also instituted with at least two falling under its authority.79  The army 
restricted public assembly to no more than two people.  This was aimed to end the Cuban 
habit of meeting on street corners and in cafes to discuss politics.  The institution of the 
law in 1935 was stricter than the Law of Public Assembly put in place during the summer 
of 1933 by the flailing Machado regime which limited meetings to three.80   
By 10 March, the employees of all but two governmental departments had 
abandoned their work including all those involved in public transportation.  To limit the 
effects, members of the army and police began to fill the jobs left vacant by the 
demonstrators.  A small number of trains and trolley cars were operated by soldiers.  The 
army also took control of the telegraph and telephone services on the island.81   
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The PCC did not take the leading role one might have expected it to.  As noted in 
the June 1935 issue of Communist International the CNOC, entirely under communist 
control, did not call the workers out until 10 March, several weeks after the movement 
began.  Supporters of Grau and Guiteras primarily directed the action, and the 
communists remained on the outside of the leadership circle.82  Even though, on 12 
March, by presidential decree, the government dissolved all unions and organizations that 
had participated in the strike, it took particular notice of the CNOC.  It singled out the 
organization and made it a crime “against the peace and tranquility of the state” to be in 
any way connected with the as yet, illegal confederation.83 
By the end of the week, 15 March, the strike was over.  Military rule headed by 
Batista continued.  Pedraza, the military governor of Havana Province, used soldiers to 
push the strikers back to their old positions.  Slowly, the situation in Havana calmed.  The 
death toll over the weekend counted thirteen with scores injured and thousands arrested.84  
The suppression of the strike of March 1935 set the tone for the next year and a half.  
With the presidential decree disbanding all organizations which participated in the strike, 
the government effectively cleared the political playing field.  The reformist groups such 
as Grau’s new party organized during his exile in Mexico, the Partido Revoluciónario 
Cubano Auténtico (Auténticos), and the remnants of Joven Cuba, suffered from a lack of 
direction and constant infighting.  This, in combination with the repression by the army 
and police, which still strictly limited the right of assembly, allowed Batista to keep the 
opposition off balance. 
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By late 1936, the radical opposition was largely held in check.  The years of 
repression drastically weakened most of the organizations that stood against the 
government. Throughout this period, Batista directed the government from a safe position 
behind the provisional presidents.  It was good situation for Batista.  He was openly 
acknowledged as the most powerful man in Cuba.  Two American journalists made note 
of his importance in, and control over, seemingly all situations.85  He continued to use the 
civilian leadership as a shield.  The existence of a president allowed Batista to act as if 
the army were under civilian control when he was faced with criticism.  In doing so, he 
deflected the political opposition’s attacks at the president and away from the real source 
of power, the army.  He used the civilian government to keep busy the opposition while 
he and the army ran the country. 
When relative calm finally fell over the island in late 1936, the political and 
economic situation was right for Batista to enter the world of civilian politics with 
reasonable prospects for success.  However, the prospect of Batista as a true civilian 
leader required something that he did not have, a powerbase outside the armed forces.  
During the ensuing three years, Batista would set the stage for a run at the presidency by 
returning to the goals of 1933.  He would take the ideals of his friend, Sergio Carbó, and 
of the reformist Grau government and turn them into vast social programs dramatically 
increasing the Cuban standard of living.  Many of his programs benefited the working 
class and through them he would open the door to a coalition with organized labor and, at 
its head, the PCC.   
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The Courtship between Batista and the Communists: 1936-1938 
 
The Change in the Communist International Party Line 
 
 
Adaptation was nothing new to the Communist Party.  In the late 1920’s, the party 
experienced a shift in tactics when Joseph Stalin forced Leon Trotsky and his followers 
out of the party.  The basic ideology of the party went unchanged; it remained strongly 
pro-worker and anti-imperialist.  However, Trotsky’s calls for a world wide revolution 
fell by the wayside in favor of Stalin’s calls for revolution in only one country at a time.  
The change was reflected in the PCC by the expulsion of Sandalio Junco and several 
others who had been longtime party members but were labeled Trotskistas.  As well, the 
Cuban party and national parties around the world experienced greater freedom of policy.  
They were no longer part of an immediate world-wide revolution, but were able to adjust 
their methods and goals to their respective national situations.86  The French Communist 
Party, the Parti Comunist Français (PCF), made use of this new found freedom in 
resolving a conflict over incongruent policies in 1933.  The French party’s actions 
brought about another sweeping reform in party policies by 1935 that further increased 
the autonomy of the national parties across the globe. 
For most of the twentieth century, the standard Communist Party line was 
staunchly against cooperation with other groups.  The Socialists were a particular target 
of communist ire.  In Cuba, this is shown in the PCC’s attacks on Grau and his followers.  
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In 1933, however, the PCF made the first gesture of openness that led to the adoption of 
the “Popular Front.” 
The open assumption of dictatorial powers by Adolph Hitler in early March of 
1933 shocked France greatly due to the devastation incurred by that country during 
World War I.  Hitler’s persecution of the German Communist Party was particularly 
alarming to its French counterpart.  On 6 March, only days after Hitler’s seizure of 
power, the central committee of the PCF issued an open letter to workers including the 
“administrative commission” of the Section Francaise Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO), 
the French Socialist Party.  The letter called for a national day of demonstrations for 
workers of all political leanings to protest Hitler’s repression of German workers.  
Maurice Thorez, a leader of the PCF, rebuffed the offer and stated that a united front of 
workers was necessary, but the fight against socialism remained a top priority of the PCF 
and the Comintern.  Nevertheless, the gesture acted as the first olive branch extended by 
the Communist Party to its traditional enemies, the socialists. 
Another characteristic of the Comintern line in those years was the opposition to 
all standing capitalist governments.  As with the socialists, cooperation with the 
government in most countries, including France, was strictly forbidden.  Because of 
apprehension caused by growing militarism in Germany, relations between the French 
and Soviet governments began to improve in the summer of 1933.  This caused the PCF 
some consternation as the Soviet diplomacy was not accompanied by new directives from 
the Comintern.  It also put the French communists in an embarrassing position 
concerning their opposition to the Treaty of Versailles.  Previously, the French and 
German parties jointly denounced the treaty for allowing “imperialist rearmament,” and it 
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became a lightening rod for criticism by French party members.  However, the growing 
cordiality between the French and Soviet governments left the PCF on the outside.  The 
denunciation of the Versailles treaty also made the party look pro-German.  Rank and file 
members called for a change. 
The PCF was puzzled by the new friendliness with the national government.  The 
response of the regional and local party committees exhibited the confusion.  Some 
continued to call for the downfall of “imperialist France” while others made resolutions 
of loyalty to the “bourgeois-democratic regime.”  The initial confusion was put to rest by 
the fear of fascism as cooperation became the new theme in the PCF and, indeed, in the 
party as a whole.  The new policy, known as the “Popular Front,” was officially 
enunciated at the Seventh Communist Congress in Moscow in August of 1935.87 
Georgi Dimitrov, a high ranking member of the Soviet central committee, 
elucidated the new policy in a speech on the third day of the congress.  He began his 
oration by lambasting fascism.  He defined it as an especially abnormal state and method 
of government, calling it a “terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most 
chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.”88  According to historians 
Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, Dimitrov chose his words carefully.  By analyzing 
the narrow class base of the fascist party, the search for broad anti-fascist unity could be 
facilitated.89  The speech continued along a similar line.  Dimitrov called for a unification 
of all workers and put no conditions upon such a union except that it must fight nazi-
fascism, “the enemy of the class.”  Likely realizing that the effectiveness of the shift 
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would be questioned by many communists, Dimitrov was sure to allow for some leeway 
in the interpretation of the new tactics.  He noted that in accordance with the conditions 
in the state and the character and political involvement of the labor organizations within, 
the method by which the Popular Front would be implemented could vary.  In some 
countries, collaboration between workers might be able to begin immediately, and might 
have some influence from the start if they were already tightly organized.  On the other 
hand, countries with less powerful labor groups might need to begin with local or 
regional cooperation before significant results could be seen. 
Dimitrov addressed an issue of critical importance to the Cubans, the idea of 
cooperation with a non-communist government in his speech, as well.  He claimed that in 
order for the revolutionary parties to work with a standing government, certain conditions 
must prevail.  First, the government must be completely anti-fascist.  Second, the 
government must be progressive enough so that the government and the collaborative 
parties seeking cooperation would not be too far apart ideologically.90  The address given 
by Dimitrov at the Seventh Congress held extreme significance for the platform of 
communist parties all over the world.  Basically, it suspended the class struggle by the 
proletariat against the dictatorship of capitalism and renounced the idea of armed 
insurrection in respect to one common goal: the defeat of nazi-fascism. 
 Francisco Caldiero, who chose Blas Roca as his nom de guerre, attended the 
Congress.  Roca served as the secretary general of the party in Cuba both before and after 
its legalization.  Upon his return to the island in late December of 1935, he reunited the 
members of the general committee not exiled, in prison, or dead after the repression of 
                                                 
90      Dimitrov, 12-18. 
 54 
the March strike.  Roca convoked a “plenum” which took place in February of 1936, after 
the elections had brought Miguel Mariano Gomez to the presidency of Cuba.  At the 
meeting Roca explained the new direction the party would take.  He accused Germany, 
Italy, and Japan of unilateral aggression and noted the lack of a united front of democratic 
nations to counteract the three powers in the case they took other more serious steps 
threatening the peace.  He said that despite the current lack of aggression between 
Germany and the Soviet Union, the Germans were still a considerable danger.  He cited 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, whose governments were friendly with Germany 
but who all still felt the advances of German militarism.  From there, he criticized the 
democratic governments for not joining with the communists in the U.S.S.R. in a front 
for peace and against fascism.  He then explained the new tactic of the Popular Front to 
the committee.  He argued against the policy of isolation that kept the party from entering 
coalitions with even like-minded groups, and called for the communists to take the lead 
in inviting other oppositionist groups to join a united front.  After he laid out the 
international plan of a union against fascism, Blas Roca turned to the issue of 
implementing the Popular Front on a national basis.  In the same way that Dimitrov 
suggested the national parties make alliances with other national parties, Blas Roca 
pushed for a coalition of parties within Cuba that with their strength in numbers might be 
able to overthrow Batista, as the PCC considered Batista their enemy and the source of 
reaction during this time.91  His propositions received some criticism as inter-party 
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cooperation was long anathema to communist directives.  However, according to Roca, it 
was clear to most that Batista was too strong to bring down all alone.92 
By this point, the shift in the PCC had begun.  Blas Roca and Fabio Grobart, the 
Comintern representative on the island, spent much of their time attending meetings with 
local leaders, imploring them to accept the new strategy propagated by Moscow.  No 
longer would the party be on an ideological island constantly at war with other groups.  
However, the entrance of the PCC into a coalition with other opposition groups would 
still have to jump some hurdles.  In March 1936, Blas Roca and Fabio Grobart were taken 
into custody and charged with the perpetration of anti-government activities for meeting 
with a youth leader in Havana.  To their luck, no one recognized them as leaders of the 
PCC, and they received sentences of only six months in jail.  While Roca and Grobart 
were serving their terms, Martín Castellanos acted as the secretary general of the party.  
A long time member of the PCC, he had extreme views.  Under him, the party fell into 
disorganization, and because of his radicalism, actually farther away from achieving the 
Popular Front. 
Castellanos threw aside the goals of the advancement of the workers and 
concentrated his work on the creation of a united front against Batista.  At a conference in 
Miami, Castellanos addressed a group consisting of delegates from the Auténtico party, 
the Organizacion Insurrectional Auténtico, the ABC, Joven Cuba, Legion 
Revolucionaria, Izquierda Revolucionaria, and Organizacion Revolucionaria Cubana 
Anti-Imperialista.  In his speech he strongly supported the idea of the Popular Front to the 
extent that he offended the other parties present.  His plan called for suspension of all 
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social goals in efforts to overthrow Batista.  Other parties abandoned the conference as no 
clear agreement could be made, and the PCC suffered further isolation. 
When Blas Roca and Fabio Grobart were released form jail, they immediately 
convoked a meeting of the party.  Resolving the crisis in the ranks that had grown from 
Castellanos’s handling of the new line became their goal.  They attacked Castellanos’s 
one-dimensional focus on the overthrow of Batista and instead argued for a coalition of 
workers excluding the bourgeoisie but still in opposition to Batista.  At the end of the 
conference, Fabio Grobart noted the continued illegality of the PCC and called for the 
creation of a party that could make legal protests against the government and openly join 
other oppositionist groups.93   
At the same time that the PCC rid itself of the disastrous influence of Martin 
Castellanos, the intellectual community in Cuba underwent a slide to the left.  Writers 
such as Ramon Vasconcelos and Nicolás Guillen, who were of the higher classes but 
gravitated toward revolutionary causes, created prose and poetry that celebrated the left.  
Though they called themselves progressives, they subtly supported communist ideas.  
These men along with others such as Juan Marinello, Enrique Serpa, and Luis Felipe 
Rodríguez made up the group Partido Union Revolucionaria (PUR).  The party’s name 
clearly expressed the ideas upon which the PUR was founded.  Its members sought a 
united front of revolutionary parties to combat Batista.  Blas Roca saw the significance of 
the PUR and noted the “strength of their spirit.”  As the PUR grew, the communists 
became more involved in it until it was commonly know to be under communist control.  
Most of the PCC’s peripheral organizations such as the Liga Anti-Imperialista and the 
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Asociation de Jovenes del Peublo made pacts with the PUR.  Under assumed names that 
bore no connection to the PCC, several associations and periodicals were founded to 
disseminate the group’s ideas to the public in various fashions.  It seemed that through 
this organ the communists might be able to attain their goal of joining a coalition with 
other oppositionist groups.    
The next party congress, the “Plenum Revolucionaro,” was held in Miami in July 
of 1937.  The Partido Union Revolucionaria and the Liga Anti-Imperialista attended the 
conference as fronts for the PCC, as did most of the other oppositionist groups.  All 
parties supported the idea of a front against Batista, but new lines were drawn in the sand.  
Grau made a speech at the conference where he firmly denounced the PUR for being a 
puppet of the PCC and said he would refuse to enter any coalition with the PUR as it 
would be the same as a coalition with the communists.94  Grau’s reluctance to join a 
coalition with the PCC may also be traced to the futile last-minute agreement that the 
party made with Machado in the summer of 1933 to end the strike and prevent his 
downfall, or their refusal of support for the Grau government during the end of 1933, at 
the time when it might have saved Grau’s presidency.  Whatever the case, Blas Roca saw 
Grau and his party as the biggest obstacle to the creation of a democratic block opposed 
to Batista. He claimed that by excluding the PCC, Grau “destroyed the block and 
separated the revolutionary sectors within.”95 
As 1937 came to a close, it became increasingly clear to the PCC that there would 
be no cooperation between the revolutionary parties opposed to Batista.  Even so, the 
PCC had made an important shift.  In response to the new strategy delineated at the 
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Seventh Congress, the communists altered their position greatly concerning cooperation 
with other groups.  At one time, the party had been one of staunch isolationists, so much 
so that it stood by, opposed to all sides, while the Grau government succumbed to 
military rule.  By the end of 1937, the PCC had turned 180 degrees in its position.  It 
reorganized into a party that called for unity with the loudest voice.  When it was once 
the PCC who refused cooperation among oppositionist parties when it was called for in 
late 1933 and early 1934, by 1937 it was Grau who refused the olive branch extended by 
the communists.  The PCC was politically isolated and not by its own choosing.  
However, gestures made by Batista would invite cooperation with some of the 
revolutionary parties.  In the next section, the path that led Batista to move toward the 
communists will be explored. 
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The Apparent Shift in Batista’s Attitude 
 Towards the Communist Party 
 
When examining the years from mid-1935 until 1940, the period when Batista 
consolidated his power and guided Cuba along a path to electoral politics, some 
historians claim that he underwent a shift in his political leanings; he converted from a 
military dictator into a social reformer.96  At least one historian claimed that Batista 
turned to this new direction so as to clean up his legacy and not be remembered in the 
same vein as his predecessor, Machado.97  This section is entitled “The Apparent Shift in 
Batista’s Attitude towards the Communist Party” because he certainly seemed to change.  
Violent clashes became less frequent and his methods gave the impression of change.  
Whereas Batista once used military repression in getting his goals accomplished, he used 
the military after 1935 to provide social services.  If one closely examines Batista’s 
record of social legislation, one will find that he in fact did not undergo a political change 
of heart but only continued the work that was begun by the sergeants and students in 
September of 1933 once he had restored order. 
Batista was one among nineteen signatories of the first “Proclamation of the 
Revolutionaries” drafted on the night of 4 September 1933 by Sergio Carbó.  This 
document outlined the reorganization of the government and economy of Cuba based on 
principles of “justice and in accordance with the most modern conception of democracy.”   
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It outlined the progressive political program that the revolutionaries intended to 
implement.98  Once Grau ascended to the presidency, the tide of a new Cuba was 
irresistible.  His government promised a series of reforms that included the eight-hour 
workday, autonomy to the university, women’s suffrage, a minimum wage law, and a law 
that decreed that 50% of all employees of any firm must be Cuban citizens.  He also 
declared agrarian reform as a top priority and promised the peasantry legal rights to their 
land.99  Even after Batista deposed Grau, the reforms instituted between September 1933 
and January 1934 remained in effect.  For example, during the chaos of the strike of 
March 1935, the government still cited firms for violating the minimum wage and eight-
hour workday laws.100  If Batista was keeping the reformist spirit alive during a time of 
violent social conflict, then there is no reason to believe that when the situation was 
calmed he would not continue the social legislation. 
That is exactly what he did.  In February and March of 1936 Batista pushed his 
legislation forward.  During this time, President Mendieta resigned because of a squabble 
with the opposition over the upcoming elections.  Jose M. Barnet, a career diplomat and a 
virtual unknown to the Cuban population, assumed the position of provisional president 
until elections could be held. Real authority, however, resided with Batista.  The colonel 
took the opportunity to push through several programs, making the military the largest 
provider of social services on the island.  Among them was the National Association for 
Public Assistance, a service established to assure the poor of medical treatment and the 
Technical Public Health Service, charged with creating and maintaining sanitary code 
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and keeping track of health statistics.  He also established the National Tuberculosis 
Council and the founded Civic-Military Institute, the aims of the former being obvious; 
the latter sought to aid children who had lost parents due to work accidents be they in 
industry, the police or military.  
The most well-known and controversial social legislation Batista pushed through 
was the Civic-Military Rural School program.  Instituted on 27 February 1936, the 
program allowed the army to construct, run, and maintain schools throughout the Cuban 
countryside.  The schools would be run by sergeants who spread across the interior 
sometimes providing the communities with their first encounter with formal education.  
The sergeants would focus on basic learning skills and include some instruction on 
agriculture, hygiene, and nutrition.  The sergeant-teachers opened the schools to children 
during the day and to adults at night.  By the end of the decade an estimated 100,000 
people were served by the program.101 
The program was not controversial because of its goals but because of its methods 
and means of implementation.  The new president, Miguel Mariano Gomez, elected in 
December 1936, saw it as an encroachment on civil power by the military.  He alleged: it 
was like “a tumor, not dangerous now, but capable of becoming dangerous in the future.”  
Batista, for his part, claimed that the program would aid the population and create “better 
Cuban citizens.”102  The president eventually lost much of his support among the people, 
congress, and press because of his opposition to the program.103  When the army 
sponsored a tax of nine cents per bag of sugar to fund the school program, Gomez 
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protested.  The Senate already passed the measure; soon the House of Representatives 
would as well, leaving Gomez without any support when he vetoed the bill.  In the fallout 
the Cuban Congress impeached Gomez. 
Some have claimed that the offering of social services at the behest of the military 
amounted to a power grab by Batista and that it was a further insertion of military 
authority into civil affairs.104  However, other motives must be examined as well.  First, it 
should be remembered that Batista came from the countryside and was familiar with its 
problems.  Much of the legislation, especially that concerning tuberculosis, sanitation, 
and education, targeted the island’s interior.  In a speech in Oriente province, the island’s 
remote and eastern state, he told his audience that his programs were there “to educate, to 
teach and prevent, to shape the mind of ignorant men, women and children.”  When 
asked why he chose to concern himself with non-military issues he responded, “Because 
there is a conscience and there are convictions.”105 
Batista’s use of the military in his social programs should also be viewed as an 
example of his pragmatism.  In the past, it had been difficult to find civilian teachers who 
were willing to go into the interior.  Those who were assigned there frequently had 
enough political influence to get themselves transferred to a more urban area.106  
Sergeants, however, were stationed in the district in which they taught.  They were forced 
to live there until their term of enlistment was up, and they were subject to military 
discipline.  They were an educated and reliable workforce and were at Batista’s leisure to 
command.  The Civic-Rural Military School program must be seen as another instance 
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when the military under Batista picked up where the civilian authority could not or would 
not provide the service in question.  It should be remembered along side the soldiers who 
ran the cable cars, trains, and other public services in Havana during the strike of March 
1935. 
In June of 1937, Batista unveiled the most ambitious and, according to some 
analysts, the oddest plan for social reform ever dreamed of on the island.  The Triennial 
Plan, as it became known, took the spirit of the reforms of the previous year and 
expanded it to a three-year program with a plethora of goals ranging from agrarian reform 
to labor benefits to cultural pursuits.  “It was a document of youthful idealism,” 
commented one historian.107  Batista was but thirty-six and sat at the top of a government 
wielding the power to enact great social change effecting millions and felt the need to do 
so.  The plan resulted from several months of consultations with civilian experts from 
around the island and from a multitude of professions.   The final version, as related to 
Dr. José I. Rivero of the Havana daily Diario de la Marina, included among its many 
programs: 
 
1) Creation of a national Bank 
2) Establishment of library system around the island 
3) Tax reform 
4) Reforestation 
5) Health insurance for working mothers 
6) Accident insurance for all workers 
7) A reform of the relations between those parties involved in sugar production108 
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The Sugar Coordination Law, passed in 1937, was the most important piece of 
legislation and received the most immediate attention.  Like many of the proposed 
measures, it strongly favored the interests of labor and small industry over those of large 
firms.  It created a government body to arbitrate problems between large estates and 
small producers and guaranteed small producers a minimum quota and price for their 
sugar.  Also, it gave legal title over the land to those who worked it, protecting the small 
colonos from unexpected eviction.109  The sugar legislation was the most significant 
feature of the Triennial Plan and the one that met with the highest degree of 
implementation.  The rest of the plan was eventually seen as an obstacle to the calls for a 
constitutional convention, and Batista withdrew it from consideration in May 1938 when 
he converted the plan into a platform for his presidential campaign in 1940. 
If one looks at Batista’s record on social legislation, it becomes clear that, 
contrary to what might be expected from a so-called elitist reactionary, he consistently 
worked for the betterment of Cuba’s working class.  His decision to stay the course 
charted by the students during Grau’s brief term in office, even when his government was 
locked in a bitter struggle with those same students, exemplified his determination.  
Many of the decree-laws issued in 1933 were enforced through the end of Batista’s term 
in office, and definitely benefited the workers.110  The rural school program and the 
Triennial Plan reflect Batista’s continuing efforts to aid the working class.  Instead of a 
shift in attitude that made the arrangement with the PCC possible, this paper contends 
that Batista actually remained constant in his commitment to social reforms.  From the 
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beginning of his time in power, when there was a problem such as the strike of 1935 or a 
need, such as the lack of education in the interior, Batista always turned to the army to 
provide a solution.  Whether it was driving taxis in Havana, or teaching in a schoolhouse 
in Oriente, the army reliably acted as Batista’s tool of action.  Batista also supported 
legislation that aided the poor and working classes of Cuba throughout his time in office, 
establishing his commitment to social reform and exhibiting his ideological steadfastness. 
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The Wedding of Batista and the Communists 
 
 
By 1937, when Batista launched the Triennial Plan, the Comintern had 
implemented the Popular Front around the world, including in Cuba.  The party was in 
search of allies.  For most of the 1930’s the target of communist propaganda had been 
Batista.  They castigated him as a corrupt, fascist dictator.  But in Cuban politics, former 
friends sometimes attack each other, and former enemies sometimes embrace.111  The 
Communist Party no doubt had taken notice of the wild popularity that Batista had 
recently gained among many of its partisans.  Batista attended rallies in sugar growing 
areas and was received by thousands of workers and farmers.112  Batista’s social reforms 
had gained him the support of the masses.  At the same time, the colonel, who was 
considering a run at the presidency in 1940, saw the isolated position of the PCC.  The 
party had repeatedly sought alliances with the Auténticos and had been turned down 
every time.  Here, Batista made his first tentative overtures towards the revolutionary 
parties.  In 1937, when it became clear that the PUR was a front for the as yet illegal 
PCC, Batista did nothing to keep it from organizing.  In fact, the PUR participated in a 
conference in July that was designed to build a coalition against Batista.  By November 
of the same year, a bill was in front of congress that proposed to allow the return of all 
political exiles.  The amnesty was well received all over the island and provided Batista a 
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method of reconciliation with some of the oppositionist parties.113  After noting the warm 
reception of such offers, Batista made the first direct gesture to the communists.  Using 
his old friend and Mexican Ambassador Octavio Reyes Spíndola as a go-between, Batista 
made further steps toward an alliance with the party.  The first meeting may have taken 
place as early as January 1938.114  They continued through the spring and apparently 
went well enough to persuade Batista to allow the publication of the communist daily, 
Noticias de Hoy, which he did in May.  Two months later, the PCC celebrated its tenth 
Plenum, and the first without attacks on Batista.  At that conference, the communists 
resolved to “adopt a more positive attitude toward Colonel Batista, compelling him, by 
means of it, to take yet more democratic positions.”115  Two weeks after the Plenum two 
leaders of the PCC, Blas Roca and Joaquin Ordoqui, attended a meeting at Camp 
Columbia at which they and Batista finalized the arrangement.  The final details of an 
alliance between the communists and Batista were discussed and agreed upon, but it is 
unlikely that anyone not present at the meeting knows the exact wording of the alliance.  
The general terms, however, are clear.  Batista would allow the communists to act as a 
legal party and reorganize the labor movement under their control.  In return, the 
communists would support Batista in the election of 1940.116  A week later Batista was 
quoted as saying, “The Communist party, according to its constitution, is a democratic 
party which pursues its ends within the framework of a capitalist regime and renounces 
violence as a political means and consequently it is entitled to the same status as that of 
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any other party in Cuba.”  The party was legalized shortly thereafter, on 25 September 
1938 and was firmly in the Batista camp.117 
The two sides finally came together to form a union that would carry Batista to 
the presidency and last throughout his presidential term.  The union was the product of 
the continuation of pro-labor policies by which he earned the support of the masses and 
made him more plausible as an ally for the communists who embraced the Popular Front 
in response to growing fears of fascism.  The two sides needed allies to attain or maintain 
power, and they saw in each other similar policies and possible political clout.  The 
political situation in the last years of the 1930’s pushed Batista and the Cuban 
Communist Party together.  Ironically, Grau and the Auténticos had a hand in creating the 
coalition that would defeat them in the elections of 1940. 
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The Marriage of Convenience: 1938-1944 
 
 Batista and the Communists’ Mutual Support 
 
 
The next section of this paper will look at the major events between the summer 
of 1938, when the two parties formally joined forces, and the end of Batista’s presidential 
term in 1944.  It will examine to what extent the PCC supported Batista on key issues of 
the day as well as what influence party goals had on Batista’s policies.  Further, it will 
look at the PCC’s top priority, the establishment of the Cuban labor confederation, the 
Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), and evaluate Batista’s attitude toward 
and support or lack thereof for it.  By looking at the flow of support going both ways, the 
issues that were concrete conditions to the pact and those that remained open to debate 
should come to light. 
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The Founding and Legalization of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba 
 
 
For the first time since its founding, the PCC could breathe the air of legality.  
Having secured Batista’s blessing, the party was able to work openly towards its goal of 
the unification of the labor movement under one banner.  It was obvious that that banner 
could not be that of the CNOC.  The central labor body had been badly damaged during 
the years of repression from 1934 until 1937.  Many of its members and leaders were 
either killed in demonstrations or riots or exiled because of them.  The organization 
remained in existence, but it was clear that a new organization would be necessary to 
unify the workers.  Preliminary steps toward this goal became the first public act of the 
party after legalization.  In September 1938, Lázaro Cárdenas and Lombardo Toledano, 
two men of clear Marxist sympathies, invited Cuban labor leaders to participate in the 
constitutional assembly of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de la American Latina 
(CTAL).  The Cubans sent a delegation representing twelve labor organizations of 
reformist and communist intentions. 
The Congress of Mexico, as it became known, began on 25 September 1938 and 
not only succeeded in creating the CTAL, but also adopted various resolutions 
concerning labor movements internationally.  Several directly or indirectly concerned 
Cuba.  Before any of the resolutions had been advanced for discussion, Cuban communist 
leader Lázaro Peña motioned that the Congress must take note of the “democratic 
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changes that were starting to take effect in Cuba.”118  In making such a motion he was 
attempting to aim the resolutions away from the radical so as not to offend Batista, as his 
blessing could do far more for the Cuban party than could that of the CTAL.  In the end 
the most important resolutions suggested the constitution of committees to direct the 
struggle of the workers with a common platform and the worldwide unification of the 
working class.119 
The spirit of unity and reform did not end with the adoption of the resolutions but 
continued, notably in the Cuban delegation.  In the atmosphere of celebration and class 
solidarity, the Cubans put aside their previous differences and joined together in efforts to 
create a central Cuban labor union.  They put their words onto paper on 22 September 
1938 in a document called the “Pact of Mexico” or the “Pact of Honor.”  They vowed 
“under the banner of class struggle, to construct as soon as possible a national central 
union in the republic of Cuba and to celebrate in Cuba a national workers unification 
congress.”120 
Upon their return from Mexico, the communist leaders immediately went to work 
preparing for a labor meeting on a national scale.  They formed a committee, headed by 
Ángel Cofiño and Lázaro Peña, with the intent of spreading their message to other 
organizations and to draw support from outside the PCC itself.  Throughout November 
and December the PCC staged provincial meetings with the aim of mobilizing its local 
chapters.  Cofiño and Peña’s committee was successful in getting positive responses from 
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the other labor groups they contacted, nearly all of whom attended the national congress.  
Finally on 23 January 1939, the meeting was held, first in the meeting place of the 
Sociedad El Pilar and later, on 28 January, in the more spacious Teatro Nacional in 
Havana.  Some 1500 delegates attended the congress representing up to 789 different 
labor organizations, many not of communist leanings.121  Grau’s Auténticos, the bitter 
enemy of the PCC, were represented at the congress.  Those present elected Ramón León 
Renteria as president of the proceedings.  
The major work of the congress was the dissolution of the CNOC and the creation 
in its place of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC).  The new 
confederation would unite the industrial, agricultural, business, and service unions under 
one leadership.  At the same time, the delegates rejected pluralism in the movement, 
declaring that only one union could exist in any place of business.  Concerning its 
internal structure, the CTC would have a biannual congress that would hold the ultimate 
authority.  So as to act as a daily governing body, a national council of 55 persons and an 
executive committee composed of 15 secretaries would be created. 122 
When it came time to elect the executive committee, communists, or those closely 
associated with the party, won the key positions and controlled the most significant 
constituent unions.  Lázaro Peña won the seat of the Secretary General.  By his side were 
other communists, such as Carlos Fernandez, Apolinar Diaz Castillo, and Justo Tomayo.  
The communist allies, Jesús Menendez, Juan Arévalo, and Angel Cofiño also won seats.  
In all, the communists held eighteen seats on the executive committee; the Auténticos 
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held fourteen, and the independents held four.123  While the committee was made up 
primarily of communists, it still represented the majority of vocations on the island and 
was more ideologically mixed than might have been expected.  This opened to the group 
new horizons in its programs and made it more dynamic.  Importantly, it also helped 
make the CTC accessible to more groups, thereby increasing membership.124 
In addition to the creation of the CTC and ratification of its constitution, the 
delegates at the first meeting in 1939 adopted several resolutions responding to the most 
pressing needs of the workers.  They resolved, for example, to demand a minimum wage 
of $1.50 per day for industrial workers and $1.20 per day for agricultural workers.  
Another resolution called for a revision of the Law of Sugar Coordination, and yet 
another sought to prohibit employers from negotiating with non-unionized labor.125  
These resolutions were nothing new in labor movement rhetoric, but they are important in 
that they became part of the communist platform in the constituent assembly.  Further, 
their appearance in Batista’s demands concerning the constitution suggests the extent to 
which the communists influenced Batista. 
By February 1939, the first workers’ congress was over, and it established the 
CTC.  This was all done in full view of the public, and it was no secret to Batista, his 
government, or the opposition that the communists controlled the CTC.  Most of those 
elected to the executive committee of the CTC were long standing communists.  Batista 
did not protest the communist leadership in the CTC but instead supported it whole-
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heartedly.  Throughout the period when the PCC was organizing and mobilizing for the 
constituent convention that would form the CTC, Batista made remarks strongly in its 
support.  As previously noted, Batista touted the right of the party to exist as soon as a 
week after the July meeting with Blas Roca and Joaquin Ordoqui when he spoke of the 
party’s desire to pursue its goals in the “context of a capitalist state.”126  He spoke in 
Matanzas in November of 1939 “amidst a great display of red flags and in close 
relationship with the Communist Party.”  This demonstration and oration showed 
Batista’s strong support for the communists even as the western world was “indignant 
over communism” because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact formalized earlier that year.127  
Batista again spoke highly of the PCC upon his return from a visit with Mexican 
President Lázaro Cárdenas in February 1939, calling them the “leaders of democracy.”128 
After the creation of the CTC, Batista continued to speak in favor of the labor 
confederation.  Though the CTC existed, it had yet to receive official recognition.  Upon 
wining the presidency in 1940, Batista established a committee made up of his cabinet 
members that would study the labor situation and composition of the CTC.  Through 
studying these factors they would make a decision upon the legality of the CTC.  
Obviously, the committee was likely to decide in favor of recognition as it was made up 
of men handpicked by Batista.  The opposition, led by Senator José Casanova, 
representing big sugar, demanded that the confederation be under some sort of state 
control.   They argued that the Cuban Congress must have the right to dissolve the CTC if 
it called for illegal strikes or if it fell under the sway of some undemocratic element.  As 
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expected, Batista’s committee found in favor of the legal recognition of the CTC, but 
none was yet offered by the Congress as they reached no consensus.129 
Over the next year and a half, Batista repeatedly called for the recognition of the 
CTC.  Realizing that the communist element within the CTC was frightening some 
congressmen away from recognition, Batista suggested that the confederation was not 
entirely a communist group.  He claimed that its ranks were populated by those of 
leftward intention but the group as a whole was purely democratic.130  In January of 
1941, Batista again dedicated himself to the recognition of the CTC in an article in the 
magazine Acción.131  The CTC did not receive recognition until April of 1942, but by that 
time Batista had made many more declarations of support for the organization and 
submitted two bills to congress with the aim of attaining legal status for the CTC.132  As 
well, he supported one bill that was submitted jointly by the communist leaders, Lázaro 
Peña, Blas Roca, Salvador Garcia Aguero, and Dr. José Maceo.133 
Batista’s unwavering support of the PCC’s leading role in the labor movement 
suggested that such action was a key component of the agreement he had finalized with 
the PCC in the summer of 1938.  The organization of the CTC in full view of the 
government and under majority control of the PCC, even at a time when most were trying 
to downplay their communist connections, proved Batista’s persistence in supporting the 
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pact.  Further, during the conflict in congress over the recognition of the CTC, Batista 
devoted himself to its cause, even at the risk of offending the anti-communist United 
States.  In the next section this paper will examine the payback.  In return for his support 
of the PCC’s legalization and its leading role in the labor movement, the Communist 
Party, and thereby, the majority of the working class became staunch partisans and 
strongly supported Batista in the constitutional convention and elections of 1940. 
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The Constitution and Elections of 1940 
 
 
The drafting of a new Cuban charter had been a priority for Batista since his 
ascension to power in 1933.   He first called for elections of a constituent assembly in 
September 1933, as a signatory of the Proclamation of the Revolutionaries drafted by 
Sergio Carbó, and again in 1935, just before the labor unrest in March of that year. 134  At 
both of those instances, however, Batista claimed that the time was not right, as 
instability would not let any election results stand, nor was there a reasonable chance of a 
compromise among the clashing parties.  There is no reason to believe that Batista had 
ulterior motives in postponing the elections as he was likely right about the prospects of 
failure that awaited any assembly during that tumultuous period.  By 1939, however, the 
national situation was calm enough to return to true electoral politics.  During the 
summer of that year, Congress established an electoral tribunal that would oversee all 
elections.  The tribunal desired to see the elections for the constituent assembly and the 
general elections held as soon as possible, and in that order.  After one postponement, the 
tribunal set the date for the constituent assembly elections for 15 November 1939. 
In discussing the Constitution of 1940 it is necessary to keep in mind that the lines 
for the general elections were already drawn.  Therefore, the members of the constituent 
assembly, while part of a handful of separate political parties, can basically be divided 
into two camps: those who were pro-government and pro-Batista and those who opposed 
the government.  The government bloc was made up of the Partido Liberal, the Unión 
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Nacionalista Democrata, the Unión Nacionalista, the Partido Popular, the Partido 
Revoluciónario Cubano Realista, the Unión Cubano, and the Partido Comunista de 
Cuba.  The opposition bloc was composed of the Democrata Repúblicano, the Acción 
Repúblicana, the Unión Revoluciónario, the Agrario Nacional, the Partido 
Revoluciónario Cubano, (Auténticos), the ABC, and finally independent socialists.  It is 
important to note this because in writing the constitution, the delegates basically adopted 
the platform of their respective candidates for president. 
Both sides agreed that the elections were fair.135  The opposition bloc originally 
claimed a victory with forty-one of the seventy-six possible seats.  The Auténticos gained 
the most seats with eighteen, the Democrata Repúblicano gained fifteen seats, while 
Acción Repúblicana and the ABC took four seats each.  The other groups, the Unión 
Revoluciónario, the Agrario Nacional, and the independent socialists did not win any 
seats and were basically absorbed by the other parties. Of the thirty-five seats won by the 
government block, the Partido Liberal won the most seats with sixteen, the Nacionalistas 
won nine seats, the PCC gained six, and the Realistas took one seat.  The opposition 
cheered their apparent victory over the government block.  Batista showed his democratic 
credentials by not using the military to sway the election results.  However, the 
opposition victory was short-lived. 
Mario Menocal, former president of Cuba and the leader of Democrata 
Repúblicano, the group he founded after he broke with his longtime party, Partido 
Liberal, was the prototypical “traditional politician.”  He seemed at odds with the Grau 
coalition which chose to label itself as “revolutionary.”  Even though Menocal and 
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Batista were adversaries, no bad blood existed between the two.  Soon after the elections, 
Menocal made apparent his willingness to join the camp of which ever side could offer 
his party the most in the upcoming general elections.  In the negotiations for Menocal’s 
support and his party’s fifteen seats in the constituent assembly, Batista offered a better 
deal.  For the price of switching his support to the government bloc, Menocal received 
the right to choose the coalition’s candidates for vice-president, the mayor of Havana, the 
governorship of three of the six provinces, and twelve senate seats.  Within days, Grau 
renounced his elected position of president of the assembly because he no longer had the 
support necessary to retain it.  This gave the government coalition nearly total control 
over the assembly.  The new majority elected Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling as the head of 
the proceedings.136 
Debate over the new constitution began on 8 February 1940 and lasted through 
June 1940.  It was signed on 1 July and was to go into effect on 1 October, just before the 
new president would take office on 10 October.  The document the delegates produced 
was touted as one of the most advanced charters in Latin America.  It provided for 
political freedoms such as obligatory suffrage for all those aged twenty and above and the 
use of the referendum.  It outlawed political movements based on race, sex, or class and 
in general, “envisaged the state as playing a positive role in economic and social 
development.”137 
Concerning social legislation, it contained all the same laws that had been called 
for since 1933, and more recently demanded in the constituent convention of the CTC.  
Compulsory social insurance, accident compensation, minimum wage, pensions, the 
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eight-hour work day, and forty-four hour work week were all included in its articles as 
was a paid vacation lasting one month.  The framers included other labor laws, such as 
the right to strike and the right to be paid only in the national currency.138  The clauses 
involving workers’ rights were so numerous as to provoke one Mexican observer to call 
the Cuban Constitution “the most advanced in America concerning matters of labor.”139 
The PCC’s response to the Constitution was generally favorable.  Nearly all of the 
demands for the betterment of working conditions the communists had made in their 
various congresses were addressed.  Blas Roca said the Constitution “closed the 
revolutionary cycle which began in 1933” and that it “confirm[ed] the most important 
conquests of the revolutionary period.”140  More specifically, the PCC made several 
demands during the convention about issues they particularly wanted included or omitted 
from the document.  They were decidedly against beginning the preamble with a prayer 
or any reference to God or Christianity.  Like their partisans the world over, the Cuban 
communists held to an atheistic doctrine in matters of spirituality.  Also they wanted to 
extend the right of the government to confiscate goods beyond what the rest of the 
convention wanted.  Further, the communist constituents were against the inclusion of a 
resolution of sympathy for the people of Finland (which had recently been invaded by the 
Soviet Union) and against a clause that prohibited the existence of a party which was 
under the influence of another sovereign power.  On all of these issues, with the 
exception of the last (which could have led to the PCC’s dissolution), the communists 
were defeated.  The communist acquiescence on these points is most significant here.  
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Now as part of the Batista coalition, the PCC apparently saw it more valuable to 
compromise and retain their prospects for electoral power than to fight to the finish and 
leave the coalition.  Moreover, their willingness to concede these points along with Blas 
Roca’s praise for the Constitution upon its completion suggested that the party was not at 
all disposed to leaving the coalition.  It also suggested that communist support of the 
government coalition concerning the Constitution and general elections formed part of 
their summer 1938 arrangement. 
When Batista negotiated to bring Menocal into his coalition, it was not because he 
was terribly concerned about the make up of the constituent assembly.  Though the 
assembly could have kept him out of the presidential election, as some representatives 
tried to do by unsuccessfully attempting to elevate the minimum age for election to forty-
five, it was not his main concern.  The two sides were close enough ideologically that 
either camp would have produced a similar document.  An examination of the 
constitutional platforms of the two parties that garnered the largest number of seats, the 
Liberales for the government coalition and the Auténticos for the opposition, revealed 
that the most significant difference was found in their visions of the laws connected with 
rights to strike and to lock out employees.  The government bloc pushed for a stance that 
benefited the worker more than the employer, but even on this the two sides were not on 
completely opposite sides of the spectrum.141  Instead, Batista feared his defeat in the 
constituent assembly was a harbinger of the general elections.  He realized that he could 
beat Grau or Menocal separately but that together they wielded enough electoral clout to 
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keep him out of office.142  There lay his motive for bringing Menocal into the government 
coalition even in the face of opposition from his present allies, the strongest of which 
came from the Communist Party.  On the surface, the communists resisted the Batista-
Menocal pact because they claimed he represented reactionary ideals and his inclusion 
would kill the socially conscience spirit of the coalition.  This complaint had some 
validity, but at its core was little more than lip service.  The communist opposition to 
Menocal stemmed from the deal it took to get him.  The communists had hoped that 
many of the candidacies that were given to Menocal in return for his joining the coalition 
would be given to their partisans.  The communists originally had their eye on positions 
such as the mayor of Havana, several senatorial seats, and even the vice-presidency.  
Unfortunately for them, the right to choose candidates for these positions was promised 
to Menocal.  However, the PCC took what some may have called a betrayal in stride and 
continued to support Batista as fervently as any party in the government block. 
By the late 1930’s, Cuban communism was strongly identified with racial 
equality.  One U.S. observer noted that communism on the island had “to a large degree 
taken the form of a racial struggle.”143  Until almost 1930, racial concerns were 
conspicuously absent from the PCC’s agenda.  But, after the Sixth World Congress of the 
Comintern in 1928 they became the center piece of the party’s initiatives.  Afro-Cubans 
and mestizos attained positions of power within the party, the first being a black cellular 
secretary in the early 1930’s.  Later, men such as the Afro-Cuban militant, Antolín 
Dickinson Abreu, who rose to leadership in the SNOIA and the mulatto, Blas Roca, a 
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longtime secretary general of the PCC, gained power and prominence.  By 1934, the PCC 
gave its full attention to the “black question.”  It started a campaign for racial equality 
and against all forms of discrimination, economic, political, and social.  The PCC 
denounced racism in the United States and used it to cultivate anti-imperialist feelings.  
One example was the condemnation of the death sentence imposed on nine African 
Americans in Scottsboro, Alabama.  The PCC printed a circular noting the “fierce 
oppression exercised by the Yankee capitalist magnates against blacks.”144  Further, when 
the Liga Juvenil Comunista denounced Welles’s mediation in 1933, the called 
specifically for Afro-Cubans to act.  “You will be more oppressed and discriminated 
against by the military boot of the American bourgeoisie that endeavor to assassinate the 
young Negroes of Scottsboro.  Struggle together with the white native workers for your 
national liberty.”145  These examples suggest that the communist leadership recognized 
the power that resided in the Afro-Cuban and racially mixed populations and actively 
attempted to use it for their own purposes. 
Consistent with this position, the PCC channeled its energy towards aiding Batista 
in his efforts to gain the vote of Afro-Cubans and Cuban Mestizos.146  Party members 
organized massive gatherings where Afro-Cuban music was featured and strong drink 
flowed freely.  At the events it became popular for the attendees to wear red 
handkerchiefs around their necks as a symbol of support for Batista and the PCC.  The 
communists used Batista’s own mixed racial heritage so as to win the vote of Cuba’s 
Mestizo population.  They even went so far as to publish a retouched picture of Batista 
                                                 
144      De la Fuente, 192. 
145      De la Fuente, 192.  
146      De la Fuente, 215. 
 84 
altered to emphasize his indigenous features.  The communists did exactly the opposite to 
Grau.  They searched for and found pictures of him that were terribly unflattering.  
Members of the party’s propaganda machine copied thousands of times over pictures in 
which Grau appeared dimwitted or as having evil intentions and distributed them to their 
followers in Havana and the interior from the back of Batista’s campaign train, the “Train 
of Victory.”147 
When the elections were finally celebrated on 14 June 1940, the Communist 
Party’s work did indeed payoff.  Batista won the Afro-Cuban and Mestizo vote by a hefty 
margin.  Members of the party itself also were quite dedicated to Batista.  The PCC and 
its offshoot, the Union Revolucionaria Comunista (URC), the successor of the PUR, 
accounted for 90,000 possible voters in late 1939.148  Even if one accounts for growth of 
the parties that may have occurred by the elections in June of the following year, it is still 
not difficult to say that the 73,000 votes cast by members of the two organizations for 
Batista represented a sizable majority of the two ideologically linked parties.149  Also one 
must not forget the influence that the PCC had over the CTC.  By the time of the 
elections the CTC represented over 200,000 workers.  Unites States embassy officials 
considered the CTC membership, by way of its communist leadership, to be among 
Batista’s most enthusiastic supporters.  The proportion of pro-Batista voters among the 
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ranks of the CTC was quite high and in combination with the votes Batista received from 
members of the PCC and URC, gave Batista the elections.150 
The circumstances surrounding the elections of 1940, like those surrounding the 
Constitution and the founding of the CTC suggest that the elections must have been a 
major point in the agreement made between Batista and the Communist Party in July 
1938.  Just as Batista dedicated himself to the legal recognition of the communist-
controlled CTC and was willing to compromise his own position within Cuba and with 
the United States, leaders of the Communist Party accepted the omission of the 
constitutional issues they wanted addressed and the loss of the candidacies they hoped to 
fill and continued to support Batista completely.  It is safe to say that the Batista-
Communist pact hinged on these issues.  In the next sections, this paper will examine the 
limits of the pact by discussing two issues where Batista and the communists still 
clashed. 
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The Continuation of Labor Unrest Led by the Communists 
And Cuban Involvement in World War II 
 
 
So as to get a better idea of where the limits of the Batista-Communist Pact could 
be found, it is necessary to look at some points of contention that still existed in the 
atmosphere of cordiality.  One such sore spot was the continuation of labor unrest still 
perpetuated by communists or by the communist-controlled CTC.  The Charge d’Affairs 
in the American Embassy in Havana, Willard Beaulac held the opinion that “never before 
had Cuban labor been so organized.”  It seems that, the pact with Batista notwithstanding, 
workers still desired better conditions and saw themselves in a unique position to attain 
further improvements in their standard of living.  As late as January 1940, the CTC was 
responsible for the shutdown of eight sugar mills in Camagüey as well as a graphic arts 
strike which closed several printing presses.151  According to Decree-Law Three of 6 
February 1934, the strikes were illegal as the strikers failed to follow the guidelines set 
out in the language.152  Yet, the strikes went on.  In fact, they were still going on in 
December 1940 when Lázaro Peña, a communist leader and Secretary General of the 
CTC, and Juan Arévalo, a communist ally, submitted a list of demands calling for better 
working conditions beyond what had been called for in the social legislation sections of 
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the Constitution.153  Violence even broke out between police and communist 
demonstrators protesting a bill introduced into Congress that would outlaw the party, by 
asserting that it was a danger to national security.154 
Conflicts such as these prove that the PCC did not entirely defer to Batista even 
though their relationship was quite cozy.  Each side still had its own agenda, and the PCC 
still stuck to its old methods of strikes and demonstrations.  The sagacity of Batista’s deal 
with the party came into question and caused some to wonder whether the party was 
more powerful even than the President.  The communists, however, never openly 
assaulted Batista nor did they ever toy with the idea of withdrawing their support.  These 
issues shed new light on the Batista-Communist pact. They showed neither side was 
obliged to support the other in all situations. Autonomy was maintained by either side.  
As well, it showed the elasticity of the pact.  Even if the two sides found themselves on 
different sides of an issue, they could maintain their differences as long as they were not 
directly antagonistic to one another.  Cuban involvement in World War II would serve as 
a test of the accord that would further prove its durability.   
The Communist Party had long been the proponents of an anti-fascist platform.  
As World War II loomed, it seemed that there would be little conflict between the PCC 
and Batista concerning the issue.  However, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed 
on 23 August 1939, ended the hopes that the two sides might move towards war in total 
agreement.  The German and Soviet foreign ministers met in Moscow to sign a treaty that 
guaranteed for the following ten years, that the two nations would settle any dispute 
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amicably rather than by military action.  Also, they made a plan to carve up Poland and 
the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania upon the completion of the war. 
The Soviet agreement to the pact forced communist parties throughout the west to 
make changes in their policies to reflect the new direction.  In matters connected to the 
coming war, Batista was moving closer to the United States all the time.  By May of 
1941, Batista told the U.S. ambassador that Cuba was ready “to enter into a far-reaching 
military alliance with the [the U.S.] for an indefinite period.”155  The Cuban people also 
likely supported an alliance with the United States judging from the fanfare to which 
Batista returned after his 1939 meeting with Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull and the 
response to Roosevelt’s famous “Last Call” speech calling for continental solidarity 
among the Cuban people.  According to an observer, the speech could be heard in the 
streets of cities across the island and was very well received.156  Because of President 
Batista’s increasingly close relationship with the United States, the PCC had to be very 
careful in how it dealt with foreign affairs.  So as not to offend the U.S. and Batista, 
instead of calling for the support of the Soviet Union, and thereby Germany, the party 
called for Cuban neutrality in the war.  This remained the policy of the party from the 
beginning of the war in September of 1939 until the middle of 1941 when Germany 
attacked the Soviet Union. 
All the while, Batista made more gestures of support for the United States who, 
while still technically neutral, were obviously in the corner of Great Britain.  This is 
evidenced by policies such as the Lend-Lease program enacted in March of 1941, nine 
months before the formal entrance of the U.S. into war.  Even as it became more likely 
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that Cuba would enter the war on the American side, the PCC was still reluctant to 
criticize Batista.  During the period while the Nazi-Soviet Pact persisted, the PCC did not 
make the same showing of accordance with Batista that it had previously, nor did it 
openly attack Batista either.  The management of the Nazi-Soviet Pact like that of labor 
unrest revealed that the agreement between Batista and the Communist Party was 
surprisingly dynamic.  While the Batista government and the communists promoted 
different policies concerning Cuban involvement in World War II, they were not in direct 
conflict with one another and the mutual support continued. 
One fact that should not be forgotten is that the Nazi-Soviet Pact ended with the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.  Had the pact still been in 
existence in December of 1941, when the United States and then Cuba formally entered 
the war, it could have spelled the end of the marriage between Batista and the PCC.  
Batista was already being pushed to break off the relationship by the Havana newspapers 
in support of his government.  As well he issued a decree that called for the elimination 
of all totalitarian parties.  This decree did not define totalitarianism, and Batista 
commented that it was not aimed at the communists, but its existence still had 
implications for the party. 157  Fortunately, however, by 7 December 1941 the Soviets had 
declared war on the Axis powers, and the conflict of interest disappeared.  Until the end 
of the war the Cuban Communists were among the most active supporters of the Allied 
effort. 
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The Election of 1944 and Auténtico-Communist Relations 
 
 
In the election of 1944, the PCC remained loyal to Batista by supporting his 
candidate for president, Carlos Saladrigas, a former member of his presidential cabinet.  
The Communist Party, by then known as the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), gave 
Batista more electoral support than it had ever before by giving his candidate 117,529 
votes.  This number represented nearly all of the party’s membership, an estimated 
120,000 members in 1944.158  It was the rest of his coalition that failed him. 
Grau ran a tireless campaign, touring the island as Batista had leading up to the 
election of 1940.  Grau made outlandish campaign promises that had little chance of 
being fulfilled.  For example, he once promised everyone “a pot of gold and an easy 
chair.”  It mattered little that Grau’s opponents labeled him “the divine gibberer.”  His 
promises for a return to the revolutionary government he led in 1934 drew many of 
Batista’s partisans away from the coalition.159  The most notable was the the Partido 
Repúblicana.  As the election approached, the Partido Repúblicano Demócrata split in 
two over Batista’s refusal to support their candidate.  The Partido Demócrata remained 
in the Batista camp, and the Partido Repúblicana joined Grau.  The other members of 
Batista’s coalition, the Liberales and the ABC, also experienced dwindling numbers in 
response to Grau’s political onslaught. Had Saladrigas won, Batista would have likely 
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remained a force in Cuban politics.  However, Grau’s victory by over 400,000 votes 
effectively ended Batista’s first regime.160 
Grau’s victory caused a stir in the Communist Party.  Due to their opposition to 
the Auténticos in previous elections, they feared retribution.  Instead, the opposite 
happened.  Shortly after Grau assumed office a deal was struck between the two groups.  
In exchange for allowing Lázaro Peña to retain his position atop the CTC, the PSP gave 
its support to Grau.  This was, however, a short-lived arrangement.  It would collapse 
over conflicts between the communists and Auténticos in the CTC.  By early 1947, Grau 
called for the Auténticos in the CTC to oppose the reelection of Lázaro Peña as secretary-
general at its approaching congress.  This delayed the congress and allowed for tensions 
to grow until just before it was to start, when communists and Auténticos were involved 
in gunfights.  The violence brought Carlos Prío Socorrás , Grau’s Minister of Labor, to 
delay the congress indefinitely.  When the Auténtico leadership decided upon a time for a 
new congress, the communists refused.  The Auténtico-led congress took place without 
any communist representation and elected its own secretary-general and committees.  As 
well, the communists held their own national meeting, reelecting Lázaro Peña as the head 
of the CTC.  The schism in the labor movement left Cuba with two general unions, and 
most of the important labor federations undecided as to which they should join.  It 
dramatically decreased communist influence and was a first step toward the total 
expulsion of the party from leadership in the labor movement.   
The next phase in the drive to banish the communists from power positions came 
in the summer of 1947.  In July, communist stevedores on the Havana docks went on 
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strike over working conditions and low pay.  On 17 July, the government sent troops to 
quell the disturbance.  The strikers opposed the troops with tenacity.  Nearly two weeks 
later, Prío, in efforts to end the unrest from above, took the CTC headquarters from 
Lázaro Peña by force and installed Auténtico unionists.  He also declared the Auténtico 
union the only legal one.  By the autumn of 1947, most of the major federations joined 
the anti-communist side.  With this act, the government gained control of the labor 
movement, and the communists were again left politically isolated.  By May 1949, 
Eusebio Mujal would be in control of the CTC, and it would become a lapdog for 
Auténtico corruption.  The Communist Party would not return to its position of prestige 
until Fidel Castro openly declared his communist intentions in 1961.161 
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Conclusions 
 
 
A close examination of Batista’s relationship with the communists reveals that, 
through its evolution, Fulgencio Batista showed many character traits that he supposedly 
lacked.  In explaining how the two unlikely comrades came together, Batista’s immense 
political skill came to light.  Beginning before the Sergeants’ Revolt of 1933, Batista 
made difficult coalitions with former and future enemies.  The first Grau government is a 
prime example. The cooperation between the reformist students and the military was not 
expected, but Batista made it work until he consolidated his power enough so as to find a 
more comfortable alliance.  His dealings with the Cuban presidents and Congress from 
1934 until 1939 further exposed his political savvy.  During this period he not only kept 
the opposition in check, but he also set the stage for his own run at the presidency by 
creating the coalition in which the communists were an integral part.  These points 
suggest Batista did not have Cuban politics tightly in his grip, nor did he rule as an 
autocrat as many have claimed, but as an intermediary between opposing factions.  
Batista was as much a powerbroker as he was a dictator. 
This work also sought to bring to light Batista’s career as a social reformer.  In 
analyzing the factors that made possible the Batista-Communist pact, it became clear that 
though his enemies claim Batista was an elitist, his record of reform showed that he 
actually implemented some of the 1933 reforms.  Indeed, he saw himself as the inheritor 
of the goals of 1933, and as such, he continued the most far-reaching efforts of Grau’s 
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revolutionary government, which gave way to the Triennial Plan of 1937 and culminated 
in the Constitution of 1940. 
Finally, this work sought to discard the image of Batista as a puppet of U.S. 
policy.  This is a theme that comes up time and time again in the historiography.  There is 
no doubt that the U.S. continued to play a large role in Cuban politics, but during his first 
regime, Batista continually acted as a thorn in the side of Cuba’s northern neighbor.  He 
sought to expand the economic and political independence of his nation, but was hindered 
by the realities of an economy that was based on trade with the United States.162  Batista 
nevertheless challenged American policy.  He supported legislation that created strict 
employment laws, taking jobs away from Americans in Cuba.  His reformist streak and 
close association with Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico worried many that he might have 
leftist tendencies.  These apprehensions were only intensified by his relationship with the 
Communist Party, but Batista continued on to the presidency with the communists in his 
corner. 
Some scholars have called for an in-depth study of the Batista-Communist 
relationship so as to understand its daily mechanisms.  This is a contribution to that 
project.  While so much of the historical record is locked away in vaults closely guarded 
by the Castro government, such a study might not be possible.  Rather, this work strives 
to contribute to a greater understanding of the first Batista era in Cuba by exhibiting the 
fullness of the leader beyond the stock character of the reactionary military dictator that 
has been propagated by so many. 
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